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THE TREATY POWER: ITS HISTORY,
SCOPE, AND LIMITS
Oona A. Hathaway, Spencer Amdur, Celia Choy, Samir Deger-Sen,
John Paredes, Sally Pei & Haley Nix Proctort

This Article examines the scope of the treaty power under the U.S. Constitution. A recent challenge in the courts has revived a debate over the reach
and limits of the federal government's treaty power that dates to the Founding. This Article begins by placing today's debate into historical perspective-examining the understanding of the treaty powerfrom the time of the
Founding,through the Supreme Court's landmark decision in 1920 in Missouri v. Holland, and up to the present. It then provides a systematic account of the actual and potential court-enforced limits on the treaty powerincluding affirmative constitutional limits, limits on implementing legislation, and limits on the scope of the Article II treaty power itself In the process, the Article develops a detailedpretext test that courts could use to assess
whether the federal government has exceeded its Article II authority. Yet even
this elaboratedpretext test is unlikely to be used to invalidate many treaties.
Hence the most importantprotection againstabuse of the treaty power comes
not from the courts but from structural,political, and diplomatic checks on
the exercise of the power itself-checks that this Article describes and assesses.
These checks provide for "top-down" and "bottom-up" federalism accommodation. The result is a flexible system in which the states and the federal
government work together to preserve the boundary between their respective
areas of sovereignty. The Article concludes that this flexible system of accommodation is likely to be more effective than any court-enforced restraint at
protecting againstabuse of the federal treaty power.
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INTRODUCTION

Carol Anne Bond was initially excited for her close friend Myrlinda Haynes when she learned that Myrlinda was pregnant. She was
decidedly less happy, however, when she learned that her own husband was the father. A trained microbiologist, Bond planned a
unique form of revenge. She stole 10-chloro-1OH-phenoxarsine from
the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas, where she was employed,
and ordered a vial of potassium dichromate over the internet. She
then proceeded to spread the highly toxic and dangerous chemicals
on her former friend's doorknob, car door handles, and mailbox at
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least twenty-four times over the course of several months in an attempt
to poison her.'
Caught by postal inspectors' surveillance cameras in the act of
placing the poisons on Haynes's mailbox, Bond was charged with two
counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 229(a) (1). The criminal statute under which Bond was
charged had been enacted by the federal government for the purpose
of implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.2 Bond responded to the
charges against her in part by challenging the application of the federal criminal statute to her conduct as unconstitutional on the
grounds that it violated principles of federalism embodied in the U.S.
Constitution.3 The treaty, she argued, could not constitutionally give
the federal government the power to criminalize and prosecute her
purely domestic acts.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Bond's claim, holding that the statute at issue implemented a valid treaty; as a result, the
court had no choice but to affirm Bond's conviction.4 In so holding,
the court expressly deferred to the Supreme Court's landmark opinion in Missouri v. Holland, which held that a statute that implements a
treaty is a constitutional exercise of the treaty power. In so holding,
the Court had effectively expanded Congress's authority, allowing it to
enact statutes to implement a treaty that it could not enact "unaided"
by the treaty power. 5 All three judges in Bond concurred in the decision, but not all were content to simply uphold the statute on the basis
of what they agreed was binding Supreme Court precedent. Writing
separately, Judge Ambro called on the Supreme Court to "clarify (indeed curtail) the contours of federal power to enact laws that intrude
on matters so local that no drafter of the [Constitutional] Convention
contemplated their inclusion in it."6
1 See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131-34 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd on other
grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
2
3
4

See id. at 133.
See id. at 134.
See United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2012).

The case was
before the Third Circuit for the second time on remand from the Supreme Court, which
had reversed the Third Circuit's earlier determination that Bond did not have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the legislation. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,
2367 (2011).
5 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-33 (1920); see Bond, 681 F.3d at 151 (noting
that "'there can be no dispute about the validity of [a] statute' that implements a treaty"
(quoting Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432)).
6 Bond, 681 F.3d at 170 (Ambro, J., concurring). Bond filed a petition for certiorari
in the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2012. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bond v.
United States, No. 12-158 (Aug. 1, 2012). Some of the authors of this Article assisted in the
preparation of an amicus brief in support of respondent in response to the petition. Brief
of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus Curiae in Support of
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Whether or not the Supreme Court responds to Judge Ambro's
plea, the case against Bond has served to reopen a vigorous debate
over the reach and limits of the treaty power under the U.S. Constitution. This Article offers a framework for that debate. We begin by
placing the issues into historical perspective. To that end, Part I examines the history of the treaty power. It begins with the Founding
Era, showing that the authors of the Treaty Clause of the Constitution
envisioned a broad treaty power. Indeed, a key concern about the
treaty power was that it would give the federal government the power
to cede territory of a state to a foreign nation without the consent of
that state. To address this concern, the Framers did not include any
express substantive limits on the treaty power but instead put in place
structural safeguards-particularly the two-thirds vote threshold in the
Senate. In 1920, the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland
reaffirmed this broad grant of authority, expressly holding that the
Treaty Clause gave the federal government power above and beyond
that granted to it under Article I. This ruling provoked significant
backlash-including efforts to amend the Constitution. But the expansion of the Commerce Clause power during and after the New
Deal rendered questions over the scope of the treaty power less critical, for most of what the federal government might do under the
treaty power it could already do under the enumerated powers of Article I. The renewed contraction of the Commerce Clause power in
United States v. Loped7 and United States v. Morrison8 in the 1990s led to a
renewed debate over the scope of the treaty power-a debate that has
entered the courts in the Bond case.
Part II provides a systematic account of the actual and potential
court-enforced limits on the treaty power. The analysis proceeds in
three steps. First, there are "affirmative limits"-limits that derive
from affirmative constitutional commands-that apply not only to
treaties and implementing legislation but to all federal government
action. Second, there are specific limits on implementing legislation
stemming from the Necessary and Proper Clause. Third, there are
limits on the scope of the Article II treaty power-limits, in other
words, on what constitutes a constitutionally valid treaty. Specifically,
we examine three potential limitations on the Article II power: subject
matter, Article I, and pretext. While we conclude that subject-matter
and Article I limitations are either unworkable or without merit, we
find that there is potential in the pretext limitation. Indeed, the maRespondent, Bond v. United States, No. 12-158 (Oct. 2012) (Oona A. Hathaway, counsel
of record). As of this writing, the Court has not yet decided whether to grant or deny the
petition.
7 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
8 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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jority of scholars who have written on this topic have endorsed a hypothetical pretext test, but thus far none has articulated the parameters
of this test or provided guidance as to how courts might apply it. We
aim to fill that gap. Drawing on the history of constitutional "purpose
tests" and their surrogates, Part II concludes by outlining a detailed
pretext test that courts could use to assess whether the federal government has exceeded its authority under the Treaty Clause.
We conclude our discussion of the legal limits on the treaty
power by observing that all the legal limits we examine-affirmative
constitutional limits, limits on implementing legislation, and limits on
the scope of the Article II treaty power itself-are, in the end, unlikely
to be used by courts to overturn many, if any, treaties or implementing legislation. Even our elaborated pretext test is unlikely to be used
to invalidate many treaties. Instead, we conclude that the most important protection against abuse of the treaty power lies in the structural,
political, and diplomatic checks on the exercise of the power itself.
These checks are so effective that they have rendered court-enforced
legal checks largely unnecessary.
Part III describes these structural, political, and diplomatic
checks. The Framers crafted the Treaty Clause's advice and consent
requirement for the express purpose of giving the states a voice in the
treaty making process. Moreover, the federal government's treaty
making is subject to the usual political checks-particularly the contest between political parties and the imperatives of reelection. To
this is added a diplomatic check: Article II treaties, unlike domestic
legislation, cannot be concluded without the consent of another sovereign nation. This requirement is an independent constraint on the
federal government's exercise of the treaty power.
Together, these checks accommodate federalism values without
court involvement. The accommodation takes two forms: top-down
federalism-the federal government abstains from intruding on state
sovereignty by not making treaties that raise federalism concernsand bottom-up federalism-states assert an active role in the federal
international lawmaking process and thus are not mere passive recipients but active players in its creation. The result is a flexible system in
which the states and the federal government work together to preserve the boundary between their respective areas of sovereignty. This
Article concludes that this flexible system of accommodation is more
effective than any court-enforced restraint at protecting against abuse
of the federal treaty power.
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I
THE HISTORY OF THE TREATY POWER
The debate about the reach of and limits on the treaty power can
be traced to the Founding of the country. This Part explores the
evolving understanding of the treaty power from the Founding up to
the present. In doing so, it exposes the antecedents of the modern
arguments about the reach and limits of the treaty power. It also
shows how the concerns of today are both similar to and different
from those of the past.
The examination of the history of international lawmaking in the
United States serves another related purpose as well. Those on opposing sides of the debate over modern-day international law argue that
their normative claims are reflected in (and hence supported by) past
practice. This appeal to the past likely stems at least in part from the
natural reflex of lawyers to look to the weight of history-or precedent-to guide future practice. But there are reasons for this historical reflex beyond a simple preference for continuity. Past practices
can serve as a guide (albeit an imperfect one) as to what practices the
Constitution permits or prohibits. One need not hold an originalist
view of constitutional interpretation to believe that past uses and interpretation of the Constitution provide some guide as to what the text
allows.
Examining the history of international lawmaking practices in the
United States and how they have developed over time-focusing in
particular on moments of upheaval-reveals that current practices
and understandings have been shaped by historical events and circumstances. The Treaty Clause was a compromise that the Framers
carefully crafted to hold together the coalition of states in a single
government. The Treaty Clause once again became the center of controversy in the period immediately before and after the 1920 Supreme
Court decision in Missouri v. Holland and again in the 1950s, when an
effort to amend the Constitution to restrict the treaty power of the
federal government nearly succeeded.9 That effort to amend the
Constitution-today known as the "Bricker Amendment" debategrew from an emerging backlash against the human rights revolution,
particularly against the fear that human rights treaties would be used
to challenge racial segregation (a fear made more foreboding to
9 See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties'End:The Past, Present, andFuture of InternationalLawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1302-06 (2008) (discussing the Bricker
Amendment controversy and its legacy for treaty making in the United States); see also
David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The HistoricalFoundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1276 (2000) (discussing President
Eisenhower's eventually successful efforts to block passage of a constitutional
amendment).
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some, as we shall see, by the specter of Missouri v. Holland and its recognition of the Treaty Clause as an independent site of federal power
vis-A-vis the states). That debate died out not long after, partly because of a massive expansion in the commerce power of the federal
government. In recent years, however, the emergence of a new debate over federalism-prompted in part by Supreme Court decisions
questioning the reach of the federal government's power under the
Commerce Clause-has led once again to discussions about the reach
and limits of the treaty power. This is the messy and sometimes dark
history that has shaped the treaty power; and it is to this history that
we now turn.
A.

The Founding Era

The Framers envisioned a broad substantive treaty power. All of
the country's power to conclude treaties would vest in the new federal
government; the states would retain no independent treaty-making
power. The Compacts Clause made clear, if it was not already, that
the states ceded all power to make international law to the federal
government. 0 The states retained a role, however, through their representatives in the Senate-a body in which each state was equally represented. The Treaty Clause, after all, provided that the President
could enter treaties "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.""

The Framers chose not to enumerate the subjects of the treaty
power for fear of restricting their national government in its foreign
relations, where unity and flexibility were paramount. Many substantive boundaries, like preservation of basic constitutional structure,
were fairly uncontroversial. Where there was disagreement, as over
the power to trade territory and regional interests with foreign sovereigns, difficulties in defining the power's substantive scope led to reliance on procedural safeguards. It was ultimately these structural
limits that assuaged fears of unbounded treaty making. The Framers
did not delve deeply into the question of implementing legislation.
They instead assumed that most treaties would not require it. As a
result, the relationship they intended between the Treaty Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause has been the subject of subsequent
debate.
10 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No state shall, without the Consent of Congress,... enter into any Agreement or Compact . .. with a foreign Power."); see also Barron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833) ("A state is forbidden to enter into any treaty,
alliance or confederation. If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with
the treaty-making power which is conferred entirely on the general government .
1
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Treaty-Making Power

The Framers consistently resisted calls to provide substantive limits on the treaty power.12 The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention and other state conventions repeatedly and openly acknowledged
the impossibility of effectively articulating the proper subjects of such
an inherent sovereign power. As Peyton Randolph put it, "[t) he various contingencies which may form the object of treaties, are, in the
nature of things, incapable of definition."1 3 The Framers emphasized
instead the political and structural limits on the treaty power-concluding that they would be sufficient to check its potential excesses.
The Philadelphia Constitutional Convention's discussions "are
notable for their paucity of material directly addressing the scope of
the treaty power."14 The Framers devoted little discussion to the issue
in part because they simply assumed that the power to conclude treaties would be the same, as was customary for all nations at the time. As
David Golove puts it, "the power .

.

. would extend as far as was cus-

tomary under international practice."' 5 And such power was extensive. Treaties ended wars,16 regulated navigation,1 7 pledged troops,' 8
and encouraged trade.' 9 Common were bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, which obligated states to engage in
12 See Golove, supra note 9, at 1132-33, 1138, 1145 (arguing that procedural safeguards were more of a priority than substantively limiting the scope of the treaty power).
See generally Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1276-85 (discussing the Founding-Era debate over
the Treaty Clause).
13 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN
1787, at 363 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1859) [hereinafter 3 DEBATES).
14 Golove, supra note 9, at 1134.
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between His Britannick Majesty, the Most
Christian King, and the King of Spain, Gr. Brit.-Spain, art. 1, Feb. 10, 1763, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/paris763.asp.
17 See, e.g., Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation, Between His Britannick Majesty; and the United States of America, by their President, with the Advice and Consent of
their Senate, U.S.-U.K, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, reprinted in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245-67 (Hunter Miller ed. 1931) [hereinafter 2 TREATIES], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/jay.asp (JayTreaty).
18
See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance Between the United States and France, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6,
1778, 8 Stat. 6, reprinted in 2 TREATIES, supra note 17, at 35-47, available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/18th-century/frl 788-2.asp.
19 See, e.g., The Barbary Treaties, Treaty with Morocco, U.S.-Morocco, June 28, 1786, 8
Stat. 100, reprinted in 2 TREATIEs, supra note 17, at 185-227 available at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/18th-century/barl786t.asp; Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty
the King of Prussia and the United States of America, U.S.-Prussia, Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat.
84, rnprinted in 2 TREATIES, supra note 17, at 162-84, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th-century/prusl785.asp; Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty the King
of Sweden and the United States of America, U.S.-Swed., Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60, reprinted in
2 TREATIES, supra note 17, at 123-49, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?
ammem/bdsdcc:@ficld%28DOCID+@lit%28bdsdccO8701%29%29; Treaty of Amity and
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peaceful exchange, to trade, and to give equal treatment to each
other's citizens.20
What little discussion there was of the issue at the Philadelphia
Convention21 made clear that nearly every delegate envisioned a
broad treaty power.2 2 George Mason, arguing in favor of giving the
power to originate legislation to the House of Representatives alone,
made it clear that "[h]e was extremely earnest to take this power [to
originate legislation] from the Senate, who he said could already sell
the whole Country by means of Treaties." 23 Future Supreme Court
Justice James Wilson argued (unsuccessfully) in favor of an amendment requiring that treaties not be binding unless "ratified by a law." 2 4
Arguing in support of the amendment, he explained: "Under the
clause, without the amendment, the Senate alone can make a Treaty,
requiring all the Rice of S. Carolina to be sent to some one particular
port."25
The Virginia Ratifying Convention provided more extensive public discussion of the treaty power, and it, too, reflected an understanding of an expansive treaty power. Critics of the Constitution described
the treaty power as entirely unbounded. George Mason, arguing for
more stringent limits on the treaty power, said that under the Clause
as written, "[t]he President and Senate can make any treaty whatsoever. We wish not to refuse, but to guard, this power . . . ."26 Patrick
Henry claimed that the President and Senate could "make any
treaty . .. from the paramount power given them." 27 He concluded

that the power was, for this reason, "dangerous and destructive."28
Defenders of the Constitution explained that defining the treaty
power was impossible without hobbling the new federal government
Commerce Between the United States and France, reprintedin 2 TREATIES, supranote 17, at
3-34, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/fr1788-1.asp.
20
See, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty the King of Prussia,
and the United States of America, supra note 19, reprinted in 2 TREATIES, supra note 17, at
162-84; Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty the King of Sweden and the
United States of America, supra note 19, reprinted in 2 TREATIES, supra note 17, at 123-49.
21
The actual writing of the Treaty Clause's two-third rule took place behind closed
doors in the Committee of Eleven during the Ratifying Convention. Its final form was
written by the Committee on Style. See R. Earl McClendon, Origin of the Two-Thirds Rule in
Senate Action upon Treaties, 36 AM. HisT. REv. 768, 769-70 (1931).
22
See Golove, supra note 9, at 1138 (describing a "repeated stress upon the breadth of
the treaty power").
23
According to contemporary international practice, a state could be dismembered
by treaty. Mason pointed to the British cession of Caribbean islands by treaty as "an example" of what he feared. 2 THE REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 297-98
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter REcORDs].
24
Id. at 392.
25
Id. at 393.
26
3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 509.
27
Id. at 500, 513.
28
Id. at 504.
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and preventing it from pursuing the country's best interests as they
might evolve. Randolph, speaking immediately after Henry, stated,
"[w] ill not the President and Senate be restrained? Being creatures of
that Constitution, can they destroy it?"29 He continued, "[i]t is said
there is no limitation of treaties. I defy the wisdom of that gentleman
to show how they ought to be limited."3 0 Madison, too, argued against
defining the treaty power. "I do not think it possible to enumerate all
the cases in which such external regulations would be necessary.
Would it be right to define all the cases in which Congress could exercise this authority? The definition might, and probably would, be defective."3 1 He continued, "[t]hey might be restrained, by such a
definition, from exercising the authority where it would be essential to
the interest and safety of the community. It is most safe, therefore, to
leave it to be exercised as contingencies may arise."32 Madison conceded that "[t]he exercise of the power must be consistent with the
object of the delegation," which was "the regulation of intercourse
with foreign nations," and he agreed that the power did not include
the power "to alienate any great, essential right."33 But he, too, was
unprepared to articulate specific limits on the power.
Supporters did not see the treaty power as unchecked, however.
Though there were no specific substantive limits, there were basic
structural and political limits. For instance, Madison explained that,
unlike the British king, the President was "liable to impeachment."3 4
And even if he were able to "seduce a part of the Senate to a participation in his crimes, those who were not seduced would pronounce sentence against him."3 5 Moreover, Madison explained, "there is this
supplementary security, that he may be convicted and punished afterwards, when other members come into the Senate, one third being
excluded every second year."36
In Virginia, as elsewhere, a focus of concern over the scope of the
treaty power was the power of the federal government to cede territory of a state to a foreign power without the consent of that state.37
This was no imaginary concern. Spain had earlier proposed a treaty
that would have traded navigation rights on the Mississippi river for
twenty-five years in exchange for trading privileges, and that treaty
29

Id.

30

Id.

31
32

3

Id. at 514-15.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 516.
Id.

36

Id.

33

34

See Golove, supra note 9, at 1141 (identifying "Virginia's passionate attachment to
the Mississippi" as the source of much of its concern over the treaty power).
3
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had been only narrowly defeated.3 8 George Mason called for "an express and explicit declaration . . . that the power which can make
other treaties cannot . . . dismember the empire."3 9

Rather than an express declaration of substantive limits on the
treaty power, 40 however, the Framers instead chose to rely on structural and procedural checks to protect states' interests. 4 ' The states
were giving up all power over foreign relations to the central government through the Compacts Clause.42 They retained a voice in treaty
making, however, through the requirement that two thirds of the Senators give their advice and consent to a treaty. The Senate, after all,
was to be composed of direct representatives of the states, by contrast
with the House, which more directly represented the people. Indeed,
at the Philadelphia Convention, Madison argued for a presidential
role in treaty making-which did not exist under the Articles of Confederation-precisely because he feared Senators would be so loyal to
states' sovereign prerogatives.43 He "observed that the Senate repre-

38
See id.; Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1281-86; Charles Warren, The MississippiRiver and
the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 271, 272 (1934) (arguing that the
Treaty Clause "was inserted in the Constitution, not on any general theory, but chiefly ...
to allay the fears of the Southern States lest, under the new Constitution, there might be a
surrender of American rights to the free navigation of the Mississippi River" (footnote
omitted)). In addition to the Southern states' concern over the Mississippi, Northern
states feared losing access to Newfoundland fisheries. Thus, "[e]ach section feared that its
own particular interest in these two cases might be sacrificed by the treaty method if a
mere majority of the senators should be allowed to approve treaties." McClendon, supra
note 21, at 769. George Mason credited the Northern states' need to protect their fisheries
with convincing the Northern states to accept the two-thirds rule. 3 DEBATES, supra note
13, at 604.
39
3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 509.
40
Federalists assured the document's detractors that territorial cession was outside
the scope of the treaty power. See, e.g., id. at 514 (remarks ofJames Madison) ("I do not
conceive that power is given to the President and Senate to dismember the empire . . . .");
Golove, supra note 9, at 1143 ("The Federalists denied that the treaty power extended to
the cession of territory."). Professor Golove explains that the Federalists actually assumed
the scope of the treaty power would be commensurate with contemporary international
practice, which they claimed "invalidated treaties dismembering a nation." Id. Later commentators construed the obligation to protect states from invasion as a bar on dismemberment through treaty. See HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING
POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (photo. reprint 2000) (1915)
(quoting I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, EDITOR'S APPENDIx 338 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.
1996) (St. George Tucker ed., 1803)).
41
See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1274-85; see also Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is
NAFFA Constitutional, 108 HARV. L. RaV. 799, 809 (1995) (arguing that an original proposal to give all treaty-making power to the Senate seems "to have been motivated by a commitment to federalism").
42
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War. . . .").
43
See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 41, at 809.
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sented the States alone, and that" therefore, "it was proper that the
President should be an agent in Treaties." 44
The Treaty Clause was thus designed to protect state prerogatives
in multiple ways. The requirement of Senate approval meant that
states could directly weigh in on international agreements. Senatorial
advice and consent also protected small states' interests from being
traded away by large states because the Senate was to be the body
where all states had equal representation. The two-thirds requirement further protected states in the minority from those in the majority by requiring a supermajority to approve any treaty. Indeed, the
Federalists pointed to the two-thirds requirement as an important protection against an unchecked use of the treaty power.4 5 A similar
structural safeguard had allowed southern states to block the earlier
treaty with Spain, even though they were in the minority.4 6 Some suggested even more stringent procedural checks for treaties with graver
implications, but these were ultimately rejected as excessive. 47
2.

Treaty-Implementing Power

The Framers devoted almost no discussion to the relationship between the treaty power and Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers.
They never directly confronted the question of whether, pursuant to a
treaty, Congress could legislate beyond its enumerated sphere for one
simple reason: they assumed that most treaties would be self-executing. There was certainly awareness that some treaty provisions would
require legislative action even after ratification, especially when the
treaty made it explicit.48 But most agree that the Framers considered
treaties to be self-executing.49 Evidence that Founding-Era treaties
REcoRDs, supra note 23, at 392.
See, e.g., id. at 347-48, 357-59, 362-65, 500.
46 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1283-84. The Articles of Confederation required
that nine of thirteen states approve all treaties. The Constitution's two-thirds requirement
was a direct substitute for this supermajority requirement. Newly phrased as a ratio, it
would not require revision when new states were added. Id. at 1284.
47 See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 41, at 810.
48 Richard Henry Lee proposed that, to preserve Congress' control over foreign commerce, "it [should] be left to the legislature to confirm commercial treaties." TuCKER,
supra note 40, at 33 (quoting THE LETTERS OF RIcHARD HENRY LEE (James Curtis Ballagh
ed., 1787) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This proposal never caught on, as evidenced by the Supreme Court enforcing a self-executing private right of action pursuant to
a commercial treaty in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Of course, it would not
take long for the early Supreme Court to announce that some treaties, or at least provisions of treaties, require legislative action before they can be incorporated into domestic
law. See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829).
49 See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding,
and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095, 2095-99 (1999) (responding to criticism of the "orthodoxy" of self-execution); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The
FourDoctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT't L. 695, 698-700 (1995) (arguing that
the Supremacy Clause anticipated direct court enforcement). But seeJohn C. Yoo, Global44
45
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were largely meant to self-execute includes the placement of treaties
in the Supremacy Clause,5 0 an overt endorsement of self-execution at
the North Carolina ratifying convention, 5 1 and statements like Jefferson's in his Manual of ParliamentaryPracticethat "[t] reaties are legislative acts. A treaty is a law of the land."52 Early practice in the courts
further supports this view. 53
That said, a few statements implied that a treaty could do what
normal legislation could not. Madison, in The Federalist No. 42, discussed the Constitution's improvements over the Articles of Confederation in the foreign policy sphere.5 4 One deficiency he noted in the
Articles was that they denied the central government authority to receive consuls, except
where treaties of commerce stipulatefor the mutual appointment of con-

suls, whose functions are connected with commerce, the admission
of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making commercial
treaties .

.

..

But the admission of consuls into the United States,

where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere
provided for.5 5
Although about the Articles of Confederation and not the Constitution, this statement reveals a background assumption that treaties
could make law that Congress could not ordinarily make. Some leading thinkers, including Patrick Henry and George Mason, even be-

lieved that treaties
Constitution.5 6

could violate rights guaranteed

by the

This point was roundly criticized, but not on the

ism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM.
L. REv. 1955, 2085 (1999) ("[T]he Framers believed that treaties could not exercise domestic legislative effects without congressional implementation."). The Supreme Court, in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), reversed this presumption. See 552 U.S. at 505-06;
Oona A. Hathaway et al., InternationalLaw at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE
J. INT'L L. 51, 70-71 (2012).
50
See Vizquez, supra note 49, at 698-99 (describing how pre-constitutional concerns
about states not enforcing national treaties led the Framers to "alter[ ] the British rule"
and 'direct[ ] the courts to give [treaties] effect" without awaiting action by legislatures).
If treaties required implementation to count as domestic law, the inclusion of "Laws of the
United States" in the Clause would have sufficed for making implemented treaties supreme. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
51
William Davie said that "[i]t was necessary that treaties should operate as laws upon
individuals. They ought to be binding upon us the moment they are made." 3 DEBATES,
supra note 13, at 158.
52
THoAs JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE COMPOSED ORIGINALLY
FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (1812), reprinted in jEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 353, 420 (Wilbur S. Howell ed., 1988).
53
See Hathaway et al., supra note 49, at 57-62.
54 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
55
Id. at 264-65 (emphasis added).
56
See 3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 507-08, 512-14 (remarks of George Mason and
Patrick Henry, respectively).
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grounds that the treaty power could not exceed the authority granted
in Article I.57
If the treaty power was understood to extend beyond the legislative power granted in Article I, could Congress ever use that power to
pass implementing legislation? On this point, it is far from clear what
the Framers intended. The Constitution makes no mention of treaty
implementation,5 8 likely because the Framers' treaties were self-executing. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides for the execution
of "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." 9 This
would seem to give Congress the power to take the necessary and
proper actions-including passing legislation-to meet the obligations of a duly concluded Article II treaty. But there are dissenters
from this view. Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz, for example, argues
that the power Congress can execute is that of making treaties, not
implementing them.6 0 In his view, then, the Necessary and Proper
Clause does not give the federal government the power to ensure that
the treaties it enters are effectively observed-despite the well-documented concerns among the Framers that unenforced treaty obligations imperiled the nation.
The uncertainty regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause's relationship to the Treaty Clause is compounded by a disagreement over
the drafting history of Section 8. Professor Henkin has claimed that
"[t] he 'necessary and proper' clause originally contained expressly the
power 'to enforce treaties' but it was stricken as superfluous."6 1 This
statement's implication of broad treaty-implementing power quickly
became conventional wisdom on founding intent and was cited in
scholarly work and by the Supreme Court.62 Professor Rosenkranz
57
See id. at 507, 516 (remarks of George Nicholas and James Madison, respectively);
see also Golove, supra note 9, at 1147-48 (describing the efforts of Edmund Randolph,
James Madison, and George Nicholas to refute Patrick Henry's arguments).
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 618-22 (1842) ("[Tlhe power is
58
nowhere in positive terms conferred upon Congress to make laws to carry the stipulations
of treaties into effect.").
US. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
5
60
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1867,
1892 (2005) ("Those two clauses in conjunction confer on Congress only the power 'To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . [the]
Power , . . to make Treaties."' (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
61
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 481 n.111
(2d ed. 1996).
62 . E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (recognizing that the treaty
power "authorize[d] Congress to deal with matters with which otherwise Congress could
not deal" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79,
82-84 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding the Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Hostage-Taking as a necessary and proper implementation of the Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages); Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, OfFederalism, Human Rights, and the
Holland Caveat: Congressional Power to Implement Treaties, 25 MicH. J. INT'L L. 265, 305
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has challenged Henkin's account, claiming that the phrase "enforce
treaties" was actually stricken from the Militia Clause, not the Necessary and Proper Clause.63 If correct, the historical record is even less
clear.
B.

Missouri v. Holland

In early years of the twentieth century, an academic literature
emerged around questions of the treaty power's scope and limitation. 64 That debate culminated in 1920 in the now-famous Supreme
Court decision in Missouri v. Holland. Like Bond, Holland involved a
constitutional challenge to a statute enacted to implement a treaty.
The Supreme Court held that the statute was a constitutional exercise
of the treaty power. 65 That power, moreover, was not limited to what
Congress could enact "unaided" by the treaty power-an important
holding because the Act at issue was nearly identical to a statute struck
down earlier by two federal district courts on the ground that it exceeded the enumerated powers of the federal government.6 6 The Supreme Court's decision in Holland set off a maelstrom that has ebbed
and flowed for over nine decades. This Section traces the antecedents
of the decision, the decision itself, and the contemporary reaction to
it.

In 1913, Congress passed and President William Howard Taft
signed the Weeks-McLean Act 6 7 with the aim of protecting the passenger pigeon and other migratory birds from over-hunting. For almost
ten years, conservation organizations, state game officials, and federal
officials at the Department of Agriculture had been pushing for such
(2004) (recognizing that "the [Necessary and Proper Clause) is a valid form of expressing
the treaty-makers' intent regarding the domestic operation of treaties").
63
See Rosenkranz, supra note 60, at 1915-16. Professor Rosenkranz also claims that
the "to" in Henkin's formulation was added in error. See id. at 1915.
64
See generally CHARLES H. BuRR, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE METHODS OF ITS ENFORCEMENT AS AFFECTING THE POLICE POWERS OF THE STATES

(1912) (discussing the constitutional reach of the treaty power); CHARLES HENRY BUTLER,
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1902) (same); EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY' TREATY POWER VS. STATE POWER (1913) (same); ROBERT T. DEVLIN, THE
TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1908) (same); TUCKER,
supra note 40, at 19 (same); Edward S. Corwin, The Treaty-MakingPower:A Rejoinder, 199 N.
AM. REV. 893, 898 (1914) ("[Tlhe United States has exactly the same range of power in

making treaties that it would have if the States did not exist." (emphasis omitted)); Ralston
Hayden, The States'RightsDoctrine and the Treaty-Making Power, 22 AM. HisT. REV. 566 (1917)
(surveying the political branches between 1830 and 1860 and concluding that the
branches did not believe they could exceed federal authority with the treaty power); Henry
St. George Tucker, The Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the United States, 199 N.
Am. REv. 560, 562 (1914) ("Can the Constitution be supreme when it embraces in its folds
an adder whose fangs may sting it to death?").
65
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
66
Id. at 432.
67
Pub. L. No. 62-430, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847-48 (1913).
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legislation.6 8 Also known as the Migratory Bird Act of 1913, the statute made it a crime to "shoot or by any device kill or seize and capture
69
migratory birds . .. during . . . closed seasons."

The statute was on shaky ground from the beginning, 70 and the
Department of Agriculture "tried to avoid enforcement for provoking
an adverse result."7 1 The Supreme Court had earlier held that states,
not the federal government, were the proper owners of migratory species. According to the Court in Geer v. Connecticut, for instance, "l[t] he
right to preserve game flows from the undoubted existence in the
State of a police power . . . ."72 Citing these precedents, the courts
declared the Migratory Bird Act invalid. In United States v. Shauver,for
example, an Arkansas court held that "animals ferae naturae ... are
owned by the states . .. in their sovereign capacity as the representatives . . . of all their people,"73 and that it was "practically free from

real doubt"7 4 that the statute infringed on the Tenth Amendment's
reservation. Courts in Kansas and Maine concurred.7 5
Blocked by the courts, supporters of the Act came up with a new
strategy. Senator Elihu Root introduced a resolution recommending
the conclusion of a treaty.7 6 He argued that "it may be that under the
treaty-making power a situation can be created in which the Government of the United States will have constitutional authority to deal
with this subject."n The Wilson Administration agreed, and the State
68 See Charles A. Lofgren, Missouri v. Holland in Historical Perspective, 1975 SUP. CT.
REv. 77, 78.
69 United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 155 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
70
Even the bill's sponsors knew that judicial invalidation was likely. Senator George
McLean "was so unsure at first whether the legislation could stand on its own that he
introduced a constitutional amendment to validate it." Lofgren, supra note 68, at 79.
71 Edward T. Swaine, Putting Missouri v. Holland on the Map, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1007,
1009 (2008) (footnote omitted).
72
161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) (citations omitted); see also Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891) ("[Ilncluded in ... territorial jurisdiction is the right of control
over . . . [migratory] fish , . . ."); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1876) ("[T]he
states own the tide-waters themselves, and the fish in them,... and the ownership is that of
the people in their united sovereignty." (citation omitted)).
73
Shauver, 214 F. at 157. The government appealed the decision-an appeal it withdrew after a new statute was enacted. United States v. Shauver, 248 U.S. 594, 595 (1919)
(mem.).
74 Shauver, 214 F. at 156.
75
See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 294 (D. Kan. 1915); State v. Sawyer, 94
A. 886, 888-89 (Me. 1915). One court apparently upheld the statute in an unpublished
and unreported decision. Lofgren, supra note 68, at 83 n.33 (citing United States v. Shaw
(D.S.D.. 18 April 1914)).
76
See 49 CONG. REc. 1494 (1913); Lofgren, supra note 68, at 81.
7
51 CONG. REc. 8349 (1914) (statement of Senator Robinson); Lofgren, supra note
68, at 81 n.22 (citing William L. Finley, Uncle Sam, Guardianof the Game, 107 OUTLOOK 481,
487 (1914)) ("Proponents of [migratory bird] protection did not see a treaty merely as a
means to remedy possible constitutional defects in the 1913 legislation. They also believed
that international effort was needed for its real protective benefits.").
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Department concluded a treaty with Great Britain (acting on behalf of
Canada) in 1916.78 Two years later, Congress passed the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act implementing the treaty. The new Act was nearly
identical to the statute enacted five years earlier that had been found
invalid by the courts as an impermissible exercise of federal authority
at the expense of the states.7 9
Root's strategy worked. The new statute, shored up by the treaty
power, was repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenges.8 0 The
first appeal to reach the Supreme Court involved two Missourians who
had been indicted for violating the new hunting restrictions. Missouri
sued to enjoin the federal game warden from enforcing the statute
against them. Missouri District Court judge Van Valkenburgh upheld
the Act. 8 ' Judge Van Valkenburgh relied on Geofroy v. Riggs,82 in
which the Supreme Court had held that the treaty power extended to
''any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign
country," limited only by "those restraints which are found in [the
Constitution] against the action of the government ... and those arising from the nature of the government itself . . . ."*1 Citing the case,
Judge Van Valkenburgh concluded that the treaty power extended to
"all questions that can possibly arise between us and other nations and
which can only be adjusted by their mutual consent, whether the subject-matter be comprised among the delegated or the reserved powers."8 4 Indeed, a central government must be able to negotiate with
other countries and reach agreements on common concerns.8 5 Protection of migratory birds, he pointed out, is "properly the subject of
negotiation with a foreign country."8 6
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Judge Van Valkenburgh.
The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Holmes, explained that
the power to make treaties is distinct from the power to legislate
under Article I. The Tenth Amendment did not reserve the power to
the states quite simply because "the power to make treaties is delegated expressly" to the federal government in the Constitution, and
treaties concluded thereunder are expressly declared to be the "su78
See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-UK, art. VIII, Aug. 16,
1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
79 See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2006)).
80 See United States v. Rockefeller, 260 F. 346, 348 (D. Mont. 1919); United States v.
Selkirk, 258 F. 775, 776-77 (S.D. Tex. 1919).
81
See United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479, 484-85 (W.D. Mo. 1919).
82
133 U.S. 258 (1889).
83
Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
84
Samples, 258 F. at 482 (quoting Secretary of State John C. Calhoun).

85

See id.

86

Id. at 483 (quoting Riggs, 133 U.S. at 267).
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preme law of the land."17 Indeed, as the Court pointed out, there had
been many cases in which a treaty trumped state law, even in contexts
traditionally governed by the states, such as property and marriage.83
As long as the treaty is valid, it concluded, the legislation made to
implement it is valid as well: "If the treaty is valid there can be no
dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government."39
Like Peyton Randolph and James Madison a century and a half
before,9 0 the Court defined flexible subject-matter limits born "of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being."9 1 In the process, the
Court reaffirmed a broad scope for the treaty power-one that
reached even beyond the limits of Article 1.92
The treaty power endorsed by the Court was not without limits.
The Court emphasized that "a national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude is involved" and this national interest "can be protected
only by national action in concert with that of another power."9 3 Notably, the Court never explicitly addressed whether the treaty was
merely pretextual-and, if so, whether that would affect the constitutional analysis-even though the Missouri and Kansas briefs asserted
that the federal government had used the treaty power to purposely
evade constitutional limitations.9 4
Contemporary reaction to the Court's decision was mixed. Defenders of states' rights criticized the opinion as allowing unlimited
expansion of federal authority.9 5 The immediate legal effect, however, was limited. As one commentator later put it, the primary effect
of the decision was to offer "a constitutional base for such further conMissouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
88 See id. at 434-35 (citing Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806)); Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)). In a similar vein, Calhoun had said: "In our relation
to the rest of the world the case is reversed. Here the States disappear." 29 ANNALS OF
CONG. 531-32 (1816). See generally Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF
IDEAS IN AMERUCA 67 (2002) ("One of the effects the Civil War had on American culture was
to replace the sentiment of section with the sentiment of nation, and Holmes's self-conscious transformation from provincial to cosmopolite was of a piece with this larger development."). Historians contend that Holmes would have been very familiar with Calhoun's
thoughts on the matter.
Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432.
89
See 3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 363, 504, 514-15.
90
91 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433.
92
See id at 435.
93
Id.
94 See Lofgren, supra note 68, at 93 n.92.
See L.L. Thompson, State Sovereignty and the Treaty-Making Power, 11 CALIF. L. REV.
95
242, 253 (1923) ("[U]nder the decision of the court in the migratory bird case, the sovereignty of the state is completely subordinate to the treaty-making power and the legislative
power of Congress in the exercise of the enforcement of a treaty. . . ."). General Thompson further warned: "In this day of internationalism the possibilities inherent in such a
system are not lightly to be disregarded." Id.
87
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servation efforts as federal wildlife preserves, reforestation projects,
and associated state land donations."9 6 This muted effect on the law
was reflected in the tepid early scholarly reaction, which came in the
form of case commentaries and student notes.9 7
During the next couple of decades, courts and commentators
continued to endorse the broad but not unlimited treaty power endorsed in Holland. In a famous speech to the American Society for
International Law, for example, Charles Evan Hughes posited that
"[t] he power is to deal with foreign nations with regard to matters of
international concern."98 He explained that
there might be ground for implying a limitation upon the treatymaking power that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties
made relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people
of the United States in their internal concerns through the exercise
of the asserted treaty-making power.99
In a subsequent case, the Court reaffirmed that "[tlhe treaty-making
power ... extend [s] to all proper subjects of negotiation between our
government and other nations,"10 0 even where a treaty displaced local
law. 10 1
96
Lofgren, supra note 68, at 114-15; see also Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States,
381 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1967) (acknowledging that in passing the Migratory Bird Act,
Congress "authorized the purchase or rental of areas for use as [wildlife] sanctuaries"); In
re United States, 28 F. Supp. 758, 763-64 (W.D.N.Y. 1939) (recognizing the state's authority for reforestation projects); United States v. 546.03 Acres, 22 F. Supp. 775, 777 (W.D. Pa.
1938) (authorizing the United States to acquire certain lands); United States v. 2,271.29
Acres, 31 F.2d 617, 621 (W.D. Wis. 1928) (recognizing the state's power to consent to the
acquisition of land for the purpose of conserving migratory birdlife).
97
See, e.g., Thomas Reed Powell, ConstitutionalLaw in 1919-1920, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1,
11-13 (1920); Comment on Recent Cases, 8 CALIF. L. REv. 169, 177-80 (1920); Note, The
Treaty-Making Power Under the United States Constitution-The FederalMigratory Birds Act, 33
HARV. L. REV. 281 (1919); Comment, Treaty-Making Poweras Supportfor FederalLegislation,29
YALE L.J. 445 (1920).
98 Charles Evan Hughes, Remarks on the Limitation of the Treaty-Making Power of
the United States in Matters Coming Within the jurisdiction of the States (Apr. 26, 1929),
in 23 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 194, 194-96 (1929).
99 Id. Louis Henkin adopted a similar view. Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the
Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 907 n.9 (1959)
(stating that "it has been assumed ... that such a requirement in fact governs the treaty
power" and "adopt[ing] that assumption as unquestioned").
100 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (citations omitted) ("The treaty
was made to strengthen friendly relations between the two nations. As to the things covered by it, the provision quoted establishes the rule of equality between Japanese subjects
while in this country and native citizens. Treaties for the protection of citizens of one
country residing in the territory of another are numerous, and make for good understanding between nations." (footnote omitted)); see also Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40
(1931) ("The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations . . . ." (citations omitted)); United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79,
83 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Convention addresses ... the treatment of foreign nationals
while they are on local soil, a matter of central concern among nations. More specifically,
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Commerce Clause Expansion

C.

The treaty power became less important as an independent
source of legislative authority as the New Deal Era arrived. The New
Deal brought an expanded conception of the federal government's
Article I Commerce Clause power. With more expansive authority to
legislate under the Commerce Clause, the federal government found
it unnecessary to rely upon the treaty power for independent authority. A repeat of the events that led up to the Missouri v. Holland decision thus became increasingly unlikely. With Congress increasingly
able to achieve all it wished through its Article I powers, there was no
need to use the Treaty Clause to work around limits on Congress's
enumerated powers.
1.

The New Deal

In Holland, the Supreme Court made clear that the commerce
power did not encompass regulation of migratory bird hunting. The
Commerce Clause was generally understood to be narrower than it is
today, and the Tenth Amendment was therefore more robust. That
would begin to change in the wake of President Roosevelt's conflicts
with the Court over landmark New Deal legislation.
In 1929, as the Great Depression began, congressional tools for
responding to the crisis were limited. In prior decades, the Supreme
Court had struck down such federal economic legislation as child labor prohibitions,1 0 2 minimum wage mandates, 103 and labor rights regulation. 104 A constitutional battle ensued, pitting the President and
Congress against the Court.10 5 Events came to a head in 1937 when
Justice Owen Roberts, who had previously voted to strike down
Roosevelt's early legislative efforts as constitutional overreaching,
switched sides.' 0 In NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp.,'o7 Roberts
voted with a 5-4 majority to uphold the fair bargaining provisions of
the Convention addresses a matter of grave concern to the international community: hostage taking as a vehicle for terrorism.").
101 See Asakura, 265 U.S. at 343 (invalidating a local ordinance, which regulated pawnbroker licensing, as contrary to a treaty with Japan); see also Golove, supra note 9, at 1270
("It would be hard to imagine a subject more local in character . . . .").
102 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 43-44 (1922); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918).
See Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923), overruled by W.
10
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1936).
104 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908).
105 See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The PoliticalEconomy of Supreme Court ConstitutionalDecisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-PackingPlan, 12 INT'L REv, L. & EcoN. 45, 56
(1992).
106
See generally MARuN MCKENNA, FRAN.LIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GRFAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 426-28 (2002) (recounting the courtpacking crisis of 1937 and Justice Robert's "switch in time that saved nine").
107 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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the 1935 National Labor Relations Act. The Court reasoned that,
"[a] Ithough activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be
denied the power to exercise that control."1 os
The next year, the Court upheld a federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of "filled milk."109 In its decision, the Court announced a highly deferential standard for reviewing enactments
under the Commerce Clause: a "rational basis for legislation"' 10 would
suffice and "the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment
By 1942, when the Court decided that
[was] to be presumed ..."
Congress could tax wheat grown by an individual farmer for purely
personal use, it was clear that prior limitations on the commerce
power were completely removed. 1 2 Federal legislation could now be
sustained by any argument for a connection to interstate commerce,
even if the activity being regulated occurred purely within one state.
By analogy, Congress could now also take greater steps to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations.""13 Combined with loosened economic due process restrictions on federal legislation, this expansion
opened the door to a wide range of new nationwide progressive
programs.14
This expansion of Congress's Article I legislative powers temporarily quieted the debate over the treaty power. Indeed, "the Court's
post-1937 acquiescence in federal programs .
108
109
110
111

. .

deprived Missouri v.

Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
Id.
Id. at 152.

See Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942); see also United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act and noting that the commerce power was "not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states").
113
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Henkin, supra note 99, at 915 ("[S)ince the revolution initiated by Jones & Laughlin, . . . Congress can reach all interstate or foreign 'intercourse'; it can reach matters precedent to or subsequent to interstate or foreign
commerce; it can reach what relates to or affects as well as what is commerce; it can reach
strictly local commerce and activities when necessary to make effective a regulation of interstate or foreign commerce. The power of Congress over foreign commerce would then,
of itself, support legislation equivalent to a large part of the law 'enacted' by treaty." (footnotes omitted)).
114 See Lofgren, supra note 68, at 117; see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348
U.S. 483, 491 (1955) ("We cannot say that the regulation has no rational relation to that
objective and therefore is beyond constitutional bounds."); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 525 (1934) (holding that New York could regulate the price of milk); W. Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525
(1923) (holding that federal minimum wage legislation for women infringed on freedom
of contract), overruled by W Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 400.
112
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Holland of much of its earlier significance."' 15 During the New Deal
and in the decades after, uses of the commerce power stretched far
and wide." 16 No federal statute would be conclusively struck down for
falling outside the commerce power until 1995.1"
2.

The Bricker Amendment

In the aftermath of World War II, a multilateral architecture of
human rights treaties emerged, championed by none other than First
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. I" The United States ratified the U.N. Charter in 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'1 9 in 1948.
The United States also signed the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, though it did not ratify
the agreement until 1988.120 Some of these treaties called for domestic legislation to give them effect. A question thus emerged whether
the Commerce Clause, now more generously read by the Supreme
Court, provided sufficient authority for implementing legislation or
whether an independent treaty power would be a necessary source of
authority for such legislation. 12 1
115 Lofgren, supra note 68, at 117; see also HENKIN, supra note 61, at 72 ("Holmes wrote
more than 70 years ago, before the explosion of Congressional powers. Today, there is
surely no warrant for confident assertion that there is any matter relating to foreign affairs
that is not subject to legislation by Congress."); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Federal and State
Powers Under the UN Covenant on Human Rights, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 389, 400-24 [hereinafter
Chafee, Federal and State Powers] (discussing Congress's influence over human rights
through the Commerce Clause); Henkin, supra 99, at 915; Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Re
stricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARv. L. Riv. 1305, 1334 (1952) ("Even if the Supremacy
Clause in our Constitution were altered. . . to exclude federal legislation in the Missouri v.
Holland situation, the present scope of the commerce power is so inclusive .. . that a great
many treaties could be made subject to subsequent federal legislation, without the necessity of recourse to state statutes." (footnote omitted)).
116
See HENKIN, supra note 61, at 65 ("No longer subject to serious constitutional challenge, Congress has embarked on unprecedented, far-reaching regulation of trade and
finance, transportation and communication, labor and management, crime and punishment, manners and morals .... .").
117 In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855-56 (1976), the Court struck
down a federal minimum wage law but reversed itself less than a decade later in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
118
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEw: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (examining Eleanor Roosevelt's
role in crafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
119 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III)A, U.N. Doc, A/
RES/217(II1) (Dec. 10, 1948).
120 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
121 See Chafee, Federal and State Powers, supra note 115, at 429 ("[T]he whole of the
latest draft of the International Covenant on Human Rights can be enforced by Congress,
either through the affirmative powers it possesses this very minute, or through those which
it will gain, after ratification, from the treaty clauses and the 'necessary and proper'
clause."); Lofgren, supra note 68, at 117.
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Some were concerned that human rights treaties might allow
Congress to legislate beyond its, enumerated powers.' 2 2 The early
1950s saw a flurry of scholarship lamenting the scope of the treaty
power expressed in Holland.'23 States' rights proponents began looking for a way to "eliminate what they saw as the Court-sanctioned
route of amending the Constitution through treaty making."' 2 4
In 1952, SenatorJohn Bricker of Ohio introduced the first of several constitutional amendments that would have limited the substantive scope of the treaty power. Over the next several years, Bricker
and others proposed many different versions of the amendment. The
strong version would have limited the scope of the treaty power to the
enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8. Bricker's first version provided that "[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the
United States only through legislation which would be valid in the
absence of a treaty."12 5 The effect of such language would have also
been to make all treaty provisions non-self-executing. President Eisenhower, along with a sizeable contingent of legislators and scholars,' 2 6
promised to "fight to the bitter end against the 'which clause', [sic] if
need be by going into every State in the Union."12 7 A weakened version of the amendment-which prohibited treaties that were inconsis-

122
In objecting to ratification of the U.N. Charter, some argued that "[t]he road to
federal absolutism is being made very, very easy." Carl B. Rix, Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the Covenant Under Our Constitution, 35 A.B.A. J. 551, 618 (1949).
123
See, e.g., George A. Finch, The Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United
States Within ConstitutionalLimits, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 57, 61-62 (1954); Vermont Hatch, The
Treaty-Making Power: "An ExtraordinaryPower Liable to Abuse," 39 A.B.A. J. 808, 809 (1953);
Frank E. Holman, Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Checkfor Writing a New Constitution,36 A.B.A.
J. 707, 709 (1950).
124
Lofgren, supra note 68, at 118 (footnote omitted).
125

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

EXECUTIVE AcREEMENTS, S. REP. No. 83-412, at 1
126
See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Stop Being

RELATIVE To TREATIES AND

(1953).
Tenifted of Treaties: Stop Being Scared of the
Constitution, 38 A.B.A. J. 731, 732 (1952); Chafee, Federaland State Powers, supra note 115, at
432 ("In a queer terror lest the Senate, which has been the graveyard of treaties, will suddenly nurture treaties like a crowded incubation ward in a lying-in hospital, the great difference between domestic affairs and foreign affairs has been forgotten. In domestic
affairs, after the boundary of federal power is reached, there is no vacuum in the law because the states can legislate amply to meet all needs. But in foreign affairs there would be
a vacuum if the federal treaty power were narrowly limited. The states cannot take over.
They are forbidden to conduct negotiations with other nations. Consequently, unless the
national government can act, nobody can act.").
127
Memorandum by Arthur L. Minnich, Assistant White House Staff Secretary (Jan.
11, 1954), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, at 1832 (William Z.
Slany et al. eds., 1983); see DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A
TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POLITIcAL LEADERSHIP 139-43, 153 (1988); Golove, supra note 9, at
1276.
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tent with the Constitution-came within one vote of passing the
Senate.12 8
In the wake of the Amendment's failure, it soon became clear
that the worst fears of the Holland-erafederalists were not being realized. The treaty power had not been used to circumvent Article I limits since the Migratory Birds Treaty Act of 1918. Four decades had
passed, and the federal government was not using constitutional technicalities to seize power from the states. Writing in the early 1950s,
Professor Zachariah Chafee pointed to the existence of political, diplomatic, and moral checks. Politically, the Senate is unlikely to "ratify . .. an absurdity." 29 Diplomatically, "[i] t takes a good deal of time
and trouble to frame a treaty, and nations are not likely to concern
themselves with matters which have no international concern." 30
Morally, government actors tend to not violate their society's established ethics too seriously.'13 In sum, a host of non-legal mechanisms
may have been at work to prevent the post-Holland treaty power from
being abused by the political branches. The Framers' procedural safeguards were being supplemented by other structural checks.
D.

Commerce Clause Contraction and the Renewed Challenge

In the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has, for the first time
since the New Deal, held that legislation exceeded the scope of the
federal government's authority under the Commerce Clause. In the
1995 case, United States v. Lopez,' 3 2 the Court held that the federal government could not regulate gun possession near schools.' 3 3 Five years
later, in United States v. Morrison,13 4 the Court invalidated the section
128 See Golove, supra note 9, at 1276 & n.688. This version of the amendment did
include the "which" clause as applied to executive agreements but not to Article II treaties.
Id.
129 Chafee, Federal and State Powers, supra note 115, at 469.
130 Id. at 468.
131 Professor Dicey called this phenomenon "internal checks." SeeALBERT VENN DIcEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 77-79 (8th ed. 1915). As
Chafee puts it, in England,
Parliament, being unrestrained by any constitution, has power to repeal the
Habeas Corpus Act any day. It can, but it won't. King George and the
Labor Cabinet can dismantle the British Navy, without needing any statute.
They can, but they won't. President Truman has complete constitutional
'Power to grant ... Pardons for Offences against the United States . . .'
Hence he might turn every prisoner in Alcatraz loose tomorrow, and nobody on earth could prevent him. He can, but he won't.
Chafee, Federal and State Powers, supra note 115, at 443 (citation omitted).
132
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
133
See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, invalidated
by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
14 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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of the Violence Against Women Act 5 that created a federal civil
cause of action for victims of gender violence. While the Court did
not make clear the precise limits on the commerce power, it now held
that the Commerce Clause did not permit regulation whose "effects
upon interstate commerce [are] so indirect and remote that" 3 6 they
would "'obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local.' "137
The same period also saw the emergence of other states' rights
doctrines. The Court developed the anticommandeering doctrine in
the 1992 case New York v. United States3 s and the 1997 case Printz v.
United States.'3 9 The federal government could not, the Supreme
Court held, compel state legislation or enlist local executive branch
officials. And in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, holding that it exceeded congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 0
These decisions raised the possibility that the treaty power could
once again be an important source of independent power for the federal government, allowing it to act in areas that might otherwise be off
limits. The cases inspired a revival of scholarly attention to the treaty
power.'4 1 Curtis Bradley, for example, proposed reviving and clarifying the subject-matter limitations that courts and commentators had
always acknowledged but never fully elucidated. 4 2 He also suggested
restricting the treaty power, and hence implementing legislation, to
135
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, tit. IV, § 40302, 108 Stat.
1796, invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
136
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
137
Id. at 567 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554
(1935) (CardozoJ., concurring) (citation omitted)). ChiefJustice John Roberts's opinion
in NationalFederation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012), in a
section of the opinion not joined by the rest of the Court, concludes that the Commerce
Clause allows the federal government to regulate, but not compel, commercial activity by
individuals and therefore cannot be used to justify the individual health insurance mandate. The dissenting opinion also argues that the individual mandate could not be upheld
under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2644-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
139
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
140 See 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
141 See generally Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103
COLum. L. REV. 403 (2003) (assessing the relationship between the new federalism doctrines and the treaty power); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law?
Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726 (1998) (discussing whether the new
federalism jurisprudence might be used to limit the treaty power).
142 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,97 MicH. L. REv. 390,
451 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Power Part IJ; see also Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power
and American Federalism,Part II, 99 MicH. L. REv. 98, 105-111 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley,
Treaty Power Part Il] (defending substantive subject-matter limitations on the treaty power);
Robert Knowles, Comment, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to Globalization, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 740, 749 (2001) (concluding that the treaty power encroaches
on "traditional state prerogatives").
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the enumerated powers in Article I-a conclusion he acknowledged
would likely require overruling Missouri v. Holland14 Meanwhile,
Nicholas Rosenkranz looked back to the drafting history of the Treaty
Clause in search of limits on the treaty power. 14 4 Others responded
with their own historical accounts, invoking Holland as a codification
of the correct understanding of the treaty power.14 5
The case with which this Article began-United States v. Bondemerged from this ferment. As earlier noted, Carol Anne Bond responded to the criminal charges against her in part by challenging the
federal criminal statute as unconstitutional on the grounds that the
federal government had exceeded its powers as enumerated in U.S.
Constitution.14 6 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Bond
lacked standing to challenge the federal statute on these grounds, but
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded back to the Circuit Court
for reconsideration. 4 7 The Court explained that "[t]he ultimate issue
of the statute's validity turns in part on whether the law can be
deemed 'necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' the President's Article II, § 2 Treaty Power," inviting the Court of Appeals to
address the issue on remand.14 8
The case has quickly become a cause c616bre for those on both
sides of the longstanding debate over Missoudi v. Holland. Commentators asked: "Will the Supreme Court revisit Missouri v. Holland?"'4 9
"Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missoui v. Holland?"o1 The Third Circuit's
decision to affirm the statute largely on the grounds that it saw itself as
bound by the Supreme Court's earlier decision could set the stage for
the Supreme Court to enter the fray. Indeed, former Solicitor General Paul Clement's decision to represent Ms. Bond has added fuel to
the fire of speculation that the case could become a vehicle for challenging the Supreme Court's decision in Holland head on. Clement's
supplemental brief before the Third Circuit in Bond suggests as much.
The brief argues for a narrow interpretation of the applicable statute,
See Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 142, at 395, 456.
See Rosenkranz, supra note 60, at 1912-18.
See, e.g., Golove, supra note 9, at 1257-69, 1314; David Golove, Human Rights Treaties
and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 579, 586-87 (2002); David Sloss, International
Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1963, 1975-84 (2003);
Swaine, supra note 71, at 1013-18; Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty
Power; 70 U. Coto. L. REv. 1317, 1338-43 (1999).
146
See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd on other grounds,
143
144
145

Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
147
See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2367.
148
Id. at 2367 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
149
Peter Spiro, Will the Suneme Court Revisit Missouri v. Holland? More Likely as of Yes-

terday, OPINIoJums (June 17, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/06/17/will-thesupreme-court-revisit-missouri-v-holland-more-ikely-as-of-yesterday/.
150 john C. Eastman, Will Mrs. Bond Topple Missouri v. Holland?, 2011 CATO Sup. CT.
REv. 185, 185.
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but then states, "if the Court concludes that the government has correctly interpreted the statute, this Court should strike it down as applied in excess of the federal government's power and in derogation
of our constitutional system."' 5' Though not expressly calling for a
reversal of Holland, the argument undoubtedly suggests that conclusion. His petition for certiorari similarly calls for the court to revisit
Holland, describing "confusion over the meaning and wisdom" of what
52
he calls "dictum" in Holland.1
The Bond case has thus brought questions regarding the treaty
power's substantive scope back into the courts. In light of the reemergence of these issues, the next Part of this Article considers
court-enforced limits on the proper scope of the treaty power.

CouRT-ENFORCED

II
Limrrs ON THE TRFATv POWER

There are constitutional limits on both the scope of the Article II
power and the implementing legislation passed pursuant to a treaty
enacted under Article II. Our analysis of these limits proceeds in
three steps. First, we examine the affirmative constitutional limits on
the use of the treaty power. These "affirmative limits"-limits that derive from affirmative constitutional commands-apply not only to
treaties and implementing legislation but to all federal government
action. The Constitution guarantees certain individual rights and protections as well as certain sovereign and dignitary interests of the
states. These affirmative guarantees may not be transgressed by the
federal government in the exercise of its treaty power or, indeed, any
other power.
Second, we look at the specific limits placed on implementing
legislation passed pursuant to a valid treaty. Specifically, we examine
the operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause on implementing
legislation. Implementing legislation made pursuant to a valid treaty
is itself valid, provided it survives the rational relation test of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
We next turn to exploring the scope of Article II itself to see what
makes a constitutionally valid treaty. There is considerable uncertainty regarding the limits on the Article II power, both in case law
and in the academic literature. We discuss three potential substantive
limitations on the treaty power: subject matter, Article I, and pretext.
While subject-matter limitations are unworkable, and limiting the
scope of the Article II power to the confines of Article I is without
151 Defendant-Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief at 22, United States v. Bond, No.
08-2677 (3d Cir. argued Nov. 16, 2011).
152 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 6, at 22.
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merit, there is potential in the heretofore under-analyzed pretext limitation. Scholars of all stripes agree that the federal government cannot enact a treaty solely as a way to pass otherwise impermissible
domestic legislation, but none has yet proposed a workable judicial
test to prevent such an action or even discuss how one might be constructed. We begin this discussion by examining the challenges involved in implementing such a test and, drawing on the history of
constitutional "purpose tests" and their surrogates, propose a potential way forward. We then examine the reach of such a test to determine whether it addresses the abiding concerns of those worried
about the federal government's expansive authority under the treaty
power.
We conclude our discussion of the legal limits on the treaty
power by observing that all the legal limits we examine-affirmative
constitutional limits, limits on implementing legislation, and limits on
the scope of the Article II treaty itself-are, in the end, unlikely to be
used by courts to overturn many, if any, treaties or implementing legislation. As we explain in the following Part, the most important protection against abuse of the treaty power is found in structural and
political checks on the exercise of the power.
A.

Affirmative Limits on Federal Government Action

Constitutional text and doctrine pose a set of affirmative constitutional commands that necessarily limit the exercise of power by the
federal government. Such affirmative guarantees are set forth explicitly in the Bill of Rights' recognition and guarantee of individual
rights and in the Constitution's provisions prescribing the structure of
the national government. Among the structural guarantees is the
preservation of a continuing role for the states and maintenance of
certain areas of state authority and control. This, in turn, has been
reinvigorated in recent years with the new Commerce Clause cases,
the expansion of state sovereign immunity, and the rise of the anticommandeering doctrine. This section explores the ways that these
affirmative limits, which apply to all exercises of federal authority, affect the federal government's power to make and implement treaties.
1. Rights and Structure
The Constitution does not place any express limits on the treaty
power, but even advocates of an extensive treaty power agree that treaties and laws enacted to implement them must not violate certain fundamental constitutional rights and structures 5 3 Courts often
construe treaties broadly or recognize expansive powers to conclude
153

See, e.g.,

HENKIN,

supra note 61, at 277.
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treaties, but they also uniformly recognize that the Constitution places
affirmative prohibitions on government action that must apply equally
to treaties. 1 5 4 The Holland Court was no exception: it first took care to
state that the Migratory Bird Convention "does not contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution" before proceeding
to its Tenth Amendment analysis.15 5
It has long been established that, although the treaty power is
broad, it does not extend "so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids."15 6 The exact boundaries of "what the Constitution forbids,"
however, are less established. Justice Field in Geofroy v. Riggs-on
which the Holland Court had heavily relied' 5 7-held that the treaty
power extended to "any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country," limited only by "those restraints which
are found in [the Constitution] against the action of government ...
and those arising from the nature of the government itself."' 58 The
Geofroy Court made clear that, at the very least, the federal government could not by treaty cause a "change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of
the territory of the latter, without its consent." 5 9
Amidst the Bricker Amendment controversy, the Supreme Court
went out of its way to clarify that the Bill of Rights applies a set of
affirmative restrictions on the treaty power. As Justice Black stated in
the majority opinion of the 1957 decision, Reid v. Covert
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the
Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire constitutional history
and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting the United
States to exercise power under an international agreement without
observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction
would permit amendment of that document in a manner not sanc154
See, e.g., Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("The section of
the Restatement . . . states that the treaty power, like all powers granted to the United
States, is limited by other restraints found in the Constitution on the exercise of governmental power. Of course the correctness of this proposition as a matter of constitutional
law is clear. (citations omitted)); United States v. Yian, 905 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) ("It is . . . well established that neither treaties nor laws passed pursuant to them are
'free from the restraints of the Constitution,' . . . such as the Bill of Rights." (citations
omitted)), affd, United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1997); see also 1 RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302(2) (1987) ("No provision
of an agreement may contravene any of the prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution
applicable to the exercise of authority by the United States.").
155
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
156
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133
U.S. 258, 267 (1890)).
157
See Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432-33.
158
Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267.
15 9
Id.
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tioned by Article V. The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and
they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and
the Senate combined. 6 0
Hence, the federal government is forbidden from violating any of the
affirmative individual rights enshrined in the Constitution as well as
any affirmative limitations on federal authority. For example, the federal government could not use the treaty power to suspend the Writ of
Habeas Corpus privilege or grant a title of nobility, 16' or indeed to
carry out any of the actions specifically prohibited by Article I, Section
9162

Affirmative constitutional limits on the treaty power also include
duties imposed on the federal government. For example, the United
States likely could not sign a treaty that relieved it of its obligations to
states under the Guarantee Clause.' 6 3 Moreover, the federal government cannot use the treaty power to alter the constitutional allocation
of power-for instance, by agreeing to vest the judicial power of the
United States in an international judicial body. To enter such a treaty
would, as Justice Black argued, amount to a constitutional amendment in contravention of Article V.164
This is not to say that the interest in upholding international
commitments is not a factor in constitutional balancing tests. In Boos
v. Barry, the Supreme Court suggested that a national interest in complying with international law might, in certain circumstances, be "sufficiently 'compelling' to support a content-based restriction on
speech."1 6 - The Court found the restriction at issue-a D.C. statute
regulating signs and banners near embassies-was insufficiently narrowly tailored and therefore did not reach the question of whether
the requirement under international law to protect the dignity of foreign officials demanded an adjustment of First Amendment analysis.
Nevertheless, it left open the possibility that international legal obligations, including treaty obligations, may affect courts' analysis of what
the Constitution requires.

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (footnote omitted).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 154, § 302 cmt. b.
162
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
163
See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in
Foreign Affairs, 70 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1277, 1298-99 (1999); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
TheJeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 64.
164
See Reid, 354 U.S. at 17.
165
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); see Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International
Constitution,31 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 68-70 (2006) (analyzing cases that indicate the possibility
of international obligations playing a role in constitutional analysis).
160
161

THE TREATY POWER

2013)

269

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

2.

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity also supplies a possible affirmative limit on the federal government's exercise of the treaty
power. The extent of this limit is, however, both controversial and
extremely narrow. Even assuming it does apply to the treaty power, it
affects only the relief available to private individuals bringing suit
against states for alleged treaty violations.
The text of the Eleventh Amendment bars any suit in federal
court "in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."16 6 The plain language of the Eleventh Amendment appears narrow in scope, precluding suits in federal court
against a state by citizens of another state (or citizens or subjects of a
foreign state). Yet, since the 1890 Supreme Court decision Hans v.
Louisiana, the Amendment has been understood as "constitutionalizing" the principle of inherent state sovereign immunity and thus also
barring suits against states by their own citizens.16 7 Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity through Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment'" but not through its Article I powers.1 69 This raises the
possibility that state sovereign immunity might also apply in cases arising under a treaty.
The historical evidence that the Eleventh Amendment immunity
was meant to apply to treaties is mixed. Congress reportedly considered including an exception for "cases arising under treaties made
under the authority of the United States" 7 0 but ultimately decided
against it-suggesting a decision not to exclude treaties from the
Amendment's purview. John Gibbons argues, however, that the history of the ratification debates shows a common awareness among
those who participated that states would be amenable to suit by individuals in federal court to ensure the enforcement of the 1783 Peace

Treaty.
166
167

7

1

U.S. CONsT. amend. XL.

See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-455 (1976)).
169
See id. at 63-66 (overruling precedent permitting Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause and noting the Court was
unlikely to justify "limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution." (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
170 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
171
SeeJohn J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1899-1914 (1983); see also Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cim. L. REv. 61, 94-95, 114-15 (1989)
(examining the history of state sovereignty and the Eleventh Amendment); cf Edelman v.
168
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Some suggest that the traditional dignitarian justifications for
state sovereign immunity should apply regardless of the basis for suit.
Edward Swaine, for example, points out that the Court has tended to
presume that state sovereignty applies even where treaties are concerned, 7 2 although it has never directly addressed the issue. Swaine
notes that because Article II predates the Eleventh Amendment, Congress should not be able to abolish state sovereign immunity using the
antecedent Treaty Clause.173 Carlos Vdzquez outlines an argument
for a treaty-based abrogation power derived from treaty doctrine, ultimately concluding that "[t] here is little support in state sovereign immunity doctrine for an exemption for exercises of the Treaty Power."17 4
Ultimately, the answer to the constitutional question of whether
the Eleventh Amendment operates as an affirmative limit on the
treaty power may have little practical import. Mechanisms for federal
enforcement of federal law and treaty obligations, and even for individual recovery, remain available under current Eleventh Amendment
doctrine.1 7 5 Current doctrine does not foreclose, for example, injunctive relief against state officials in their personal capacities.176 There is
also some support for enforcing treaty violations under 42 U.S.C.

Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 n.9 (1974) (noting that a theory of broad state sovereign immunity from suit by individuals was "the prevailing view at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution").
172
See Swaine, supra note 141, at 435 n.131 (citing Fed. Republic of Ger. v. United
States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999) (per curiam) ("[A] foreign government's ability here to
assert a claim against a State is without evident support in the Vienna Convention and in
probable contravention of Eleventh Amendment principles." (internal quotation marks
omitted))); supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,
377 (1998) (per curiam) (citing the Eleventh Amendment as "a separate reason why Paraguay's suit might not succeed").
173 See Swaine, supra note 141, at 433-37; see also Seminole Tribe of Ra., 517 U.S. at 66
(stating that antecedent provisions of the Constitution do not limit the Eleventh
Amendment).
174 Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713,
726 (2002) (emphasis added). But see Susan Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and "The
Plan of the Convention, "42 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 743-44, 749 (2002) (questioning the fundamental assumption that current state sovereign immunity doctrine is correct). Certain
competing interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment-especially the textualist argument that the Amendment eliminated only federal diversity jurisdiction over private suits
against states, see Akhil Reed Amar, OfSovereignty andFederalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-84
(1987)-would not bar private suits against states based on treaties, since those would fall
within constitutionally protected federal question jurisdiction. Cf Bradley, Treaty Power
Part II, supra note 142, at 400 (noting that the Court's recent state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence has narrowed, rather than broadened, the federal government's ability to
abrogate state immunity).
175
See VAzquez, supranote 174, at 737-39. Indeed, VAzquez argues that the only remedies foreclosed by state sovereign immunity are suits brought by private parties, foreign
states, or Indian tribes seeking damages against the states themselves. Id. at 738.
176
See Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
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§ 1983.177 Thus, to the extent that the Eleventh Amendment only affects the relief available to private individuals bringing suit against
states for alleged treaty violations, the limits it poses on the treaty
power, if any, would be narrow.
3.

Anticommandeering

Anticommandeering doctrine may provide another affirmative
limit on the federal treaty power-though, again, a controversial one
that would apply only in a narrow set of circumstances. Anticommandeering does not limit the permissible subjects of congressional
regulation but rather restricts the method of regulation.17 8 It prohibits the federal government from "commandeering" state governments-though when and how is a matter of significant debate.
The anticommandeering doctrine announced in New York v.
United States and expanded in Printz v. United States places affirmative
limits on the federal government's powers to enact domestic legislation. Yet whether those principles apply beyond the Commerce
Clause context, much less to the treaty power specifically, remains
deeply unsettled.17 9 In New York, the Supreme Court held that the
federal government could not require state and local legislatures to
pass legislation governing interstate commerce.1 s0 Five years later in
Printz, the Court held that the federal government could not compel
state executive officers to participate in a federal regulatory
scheme.18 1 The Printz Court read New York broadly, stating, "[t]he
Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program."1 82 In the 2000 case Reno v. Condon, the Court
177 See Hathaway et al., supra note 49, at 78-80 (discussing the use of Section 1983
actions for treaty violations); Jeremy Lawrence, Treaty Violations, Section 1983, and International Law Theory, 16 Sw. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-14 (2010).
178 This distinction is the most clear in New York: the subject of the legislation at issue
in that case-interstate commerce-was undeniably within the purview of Congress; only
its method was impermissible. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) ("In New York
. . ., we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over
the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.").
179
See Swaine, supra note 141, at 424.
180 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
181
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The Court clarified in Reno, 528
U.S. at 150-51, that anticommandeering bars federal control over state regulation of private individuals but not federal regulation of the states themselves.
182
Printz,521 U.S. at 935. The majority rejected a narrower interpretation of New York
that would have made the applicability of anticommandeering contingent on whether the
federal orders commanded state officials-legislative or executive-to exercise discretion
or policymaking authority. Id. at 927 (stating that "[t]he Government's distinction between 'making' law and merely 'enforcing' it, between 'policymaking' and mere 'implementation,' is an interesting one" but ultimately rejecting it as unworkable). The
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clarified that federal enactments are permissible when they "regulate [ ] state activities" but not when they "seek [ ] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties."' 8 3 That the
regulation requires "time and effort" on the part of the state is not
dispositive: "Any federal regulation demands compliance. That a
State wishing to engage in certain activity must take administrative
and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional
defect."' 8 4
Applied to the treaty context, anticommandeering might appear
to prevent the federal government from using treaties to force state
legislatures to pass regulations or to compel state executive officials to
perform particular acts. Read broadly, this prohibition could even
jeopardize such treaties as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), which requires signatory states to inform detained foreign nationals of the right to confer with the consul of their
country.18 5 If the United States were prevented from requiring state
officers to conduct law enforcement activities in a certain way or from
compelling states legislatures to adopt legislation in compliance with
the Convention, the result could be adverse to the interests of both
federalism and foreign affairs. To fulfill its treaty obligations, the federal government would have to enforce the Convention's requirements by having federal agents inform foreign nationals of their rights
even when they are taken into state or local state custody-a solution
that would not only be impractical but would also "create [ ] incentives

principles underlying New York and Printz have since permeated the Court's opinions in the
closely related state sovereign immunity context. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999),
the Court drew on the reasoning of its anticommandeering cases to hold that Congress
could not enact legislation subjecting states to private suit in state court. Id. at 749 ("A
power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the other branches of the
State .. . is the power first to turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the
entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals."
(citation omitted)).
183 Reno, 528 U.S. at 150 (quoting South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15
(1988)).
184 Id. at 150-51.
185
SeeVienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36.1(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]. The Convention was the subject of Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), in which Breard, a foreign national who had been sentenced
to death in Virginia for attempted rape and capital murder, challenged his sentence on the
ground that Virginia had violated the Convention by failing to inform him of his right to
consult with the consul of his country. The Supreme Court, denying certiorari, held that
Breard had procedurally defaulted on his claim by failing to raise it in state court; it did not
reach questions of federalism or anticommandeering. Nevertheless, because the Convention appears to commandeer state officers-in this case, to force them to comply with
certain procedures upon the arrest of a foreign national-the case raises interesting questions about whether anticommandeering applies to treaties.
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for the National Government to aggrandize itself' 18 6 in a manner contrary to the very core of federalism principles.
Yet there are many reasons to think the anticommandeering doctrine does not apply with full force in the treaty context. Carlos V .zquez, for example, argues that a broad version of anticommandeering
(such as a rule barring the federal government from imposing obligations on states but not on private individuals or from affecting states
"in their role as governments") could not plausibly apply to treaties.' 8 7
Such a rule would result in the invalidation of the typical treaty, which
binds states-parties, not individuals, and would be inconsistent with
longstanding Supreme Court doctrine repeatedly upholding such
treaties.18 8
In addition, the rationale of the anticommandeering doctrine
does not have the same force in the treaty context. The Compacts
Clause expressly prohibits the states from entering treaties without the
consent of the federal government. As a consequence, the states have
no treaty-making power to protect from federal encroachment. 8 9 At
the same time, if the federal government cannot compel some state
cooperation and compliance, its capacity to enter treaties would be
severely hampered. Indeed, the Framers delegated all the treaty making power to the federal government precisely in response to the
problems created by the decentralized system under the Articles of
Confederation.o9 0 Restricting the federal government's ability to bind
the nation on the international plane by placing limitations on statelevel implementation conflicts would undermine the aim of providing
for an effective federal treaty power.' 9
Printz, 521 U.S. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Vdzquez, supra note 145, at 1347-48, 1351-53; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The
GlobalDimension ofR1RA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 33, 52 (1997) (noting "the inapplicability of
New York v. United States to exercises of the treaty power, and the weakness of the evidence
for the anti-commandeering principle in general" (footnote omitted)); Laurence H. Tribe,
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221, 1260 (1995) (noting that the limit on Congress's lawmaking
power to the enactment of laws "applying generally and directly to the nation's people, as
opposed to the enactment of directives commandeering the states as such" is "not applicable, of course, to the treaty power").
188 See Vdzquez, supra note 145, at 1348 ("Interpreting the anticommandeering principle of New York and Printz to invalidate such obligations would thus require the rejection of
numerous treaty precedents.").
189 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 922-23.
190 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1630, 1653 (1999); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 243 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("Under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties . .. will always
be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner-whereas adjudications on
the same points and questions in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not
always accord or be consistent ....
).
191 To be sure, as early as 1796, the Supreme Court interpreted the Supremacy Clause
as clearly requiring state courts to enforce national treaty obligations. See Ware v. Hylton, 3
186
187
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The separation-of-powers rationale for executive anticommandeering also has less force in the treaty context. The Printz Court
argued that transferring the power to execute federal laws to state officials would impinge upon presidential authority. 19 2 However, the
danger of dilution of executive power seems remote in the treaty context, given that a treaty cannot become effective without the President's initiative and ratification. By contrast, a statute may be passed
over a presidential veto.
Even accepting arguendo that the anticommandeering doctrine
applies to treaties, the restrictions could in many cases be avoided.
Indeed, the New York Court suggested methods by which Congress
could encourage, rather than compel, state regulation.' 9 3 In addition, the federal government could act directly to implement the
treaty through creation of a federal bureaucracy for that purpose.' 9 4
For these reasons, the anticommandeering doctrine does not seem
likely to be a significant, effective constraint on the treaty power.
B. Limits on Implementing Legislation
While any affirmative limits apply to the treaty power as a whole,
the Necessary and Proper Clause may provide secondary restraints
that operate solely on implementing legislation. The crux of the Holland holding lies in Holmes's assertion that "[i]f the treaty is valid
there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article
I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the
Government."19 5 Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith note that this
proposition is "[tlhe least controversial holding of Holland;"19 6 most
subsequent court opinions have indeed treated it as settled.' 9 7 But
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796). Yet this does not distinguish treaties from federal statutes,
which state courts must also enforce, by virtue of the strict textual mandate of the
Supremacy Clause. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The Printz holding does not
disturb the basic principle that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law. See Printz,
521 U.S. at 928-29 (distinguishing Testa, 330 U.S. 386, and Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)). See generally Martin H. Redish & Steven G.
Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implicationsfor the Theory ofJudicialFederalism, 32 INo. L. REv. 71 (1998) (discussing the applicability of New York and Printz to state
courts).
192 See 1intz, 521 U.S. at 922-23.
193 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-68 (1992).
194 CitingJustice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Printz, Carlos Vdzquez notes that there
is an irony that "the federal government's inability to commandeer may paradoxically result in the creation of an -unwieldy federal bureaucracy more threatening to the states."
Vizquez, supra note 145, at 1359.
195 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
196 CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELA-rIONs LAW 419 (2d ed.
2006).
197 See, e.g., United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR,
2007 WL 2002452, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2007) (applying Missouri to uphold the Torture
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the soundness of that principle has recently come into question, once
again, in the case with which this Article began-UnitedStates v. Bond.
In Bond, the appellant was convicted under the Chemical Weapons Act for use of a chemical weapon.19 8 Bond argues that the statute,
enacted to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention, is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress's enumerated powers and intrudes on powers reserved to the states.19 9 She has specifically
contested the government's reliance on the Necessary and Proper
Clause as the sole basis for the federal statute.20 0 She further argues
that "[tihe Treaty Power is truly boundless under the government's
approach, as any federal statute passed to enact an international treaty
would necessarily pass constitutional muster."201 Hence, the government could use the treaty power as a "'back door' to resurrect federal
legislation invalidated by the Supreme Court as exceeding Congress'
authority" as well as to create federal jurisdiction over all crimes even
in the absence of a federal nexus. 202
In its first ruling, the Third Circuit did not reach the constitutional questions, finding that the appellant lacked standing to bring a
Tenth Amendment challenge to the Chemical Weapons Act.2 0 3 The
Supreme Court reversed that decision,20 4 however, creating the possibility that the scope of the government's power to implement treaties
through the Necessary and Proper Clause may in fact be ripe for reconsideration. On remand, the Third Circuit expressed significant
discomfort with Holland. Although acknowledging that it was "bound
to take at face value" Justice Holmes's statement about the Necessary
and Proper Clause2 05 and equally constrained by the "simplistic reading" the Supreme Court gave that passage in Reid v. Covert,206 the
Act as necessary and proper to implement the Convention Against Torture). But see
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. New York, 860 F.2d 1145, 1163 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
relation of [the treaty] power to state prerogatives is less certain. It is highly doubtful that
under the Articles of Confederation the reconciliation of national power and state prerogatives was subject to adjustment in favor of national power simply by the use of national
treaties." (citation omitted)).
198 See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131-33 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd on other
grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
199 See Defendant-Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 12, United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d
128 (3d. Cir. 2009) (No. 08-2677).
200 See id. at 16-18.
201 Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 24, Bond, 581 F.3d 128 (No. 08-2677); see also Defendant-Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief at 20, United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149 (3d
Cir. 2012) (No. 08-2677) ("[U]nder our Constitution, determining what punishment is the
appropriate response to purely local crimes is entrusted to the exclusive authority of state
officials.").
202 Defendant-Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 24, Bond, 581 F3d 128 (No. 08-2677).
203 See Bond, 581 F.3d at 137-38.
204 See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2367 (2011).
205 Bond, 681 F.3d at 162.
206 See id.
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Third Circuit considered Bond's arguments about potentially limitless
congressional power to be "not without merit."20 7 It cited the argument by Nicholas Rozenkranz that Holland rests on a misreading of
the Treaty Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper
Clause 20s but concluded that "Holland remains binding precedent ...
and forecloses this line of reasoning." 209 Judge Ambro, in a concurring opinion, went so far as to "urge" the Supreme Court to clarify the
Holland statement, describing its consequences as creating an "acquirable police power." 21 0
Historically, the Necessary and Proper Clause has been read to
grant broad authority to the federal government to enact legislation
in pursuance of a legitimate constitutional purpose. In McCulloch v.
Maryland, ChiefJustice Marshall read "necessary" as "appropriate ...
and conducive to the end."2 11 Presuming a legitimate goal that lies
within the scope of the Constitution, "all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."2 12 That reading has since guided courts' application of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.2 13
Invoking Marshall's language from McCulloch, the Supreme Court
recently employed an expansive reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. In United States v. Comstock, the Court upheld a federal statute
allowing the civil commitment of a mentally ill, sexually dangerous
federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise have
been released.2 14 In addition to finding congressional authority in an
area "more than one step removed from a specifically enumerated
power,"2 15 the Court stated that deciding whether Congress has the
authority to enact a particular statute under the Necessary and Proper
207 Id. at 158 ("Juxtaposed against increasingly broad conceptions of the Treaty
Power's scope, reading Holland to confer on Congress an unfettered ability to effectuate
what would now be considered by some to be valid exercises of the Treaty Power runs a
significant risk of disrupting the delicate balance between state and federal authority.").
208 See Rosenkranz, supra note 60, at 1882-85.
209 Bond, 681 F.3d at 157 n.9. The Third Circuit was responding to the argument of
Petitioner that the court should engage in a "fundamental reassessment" of the Missouri
holding. Brief for Petitioner at 38-40, Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 09-1227) (citing Rosenkranz, supra note 60, at 1868).
210 Bond, 681 F.3d at 169-70 (Ambro, J., concurring).
211 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819).
212 Id. at 421.
213 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 59-60 (2005); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 650 (1966); United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 948 (8th Cir. 2003), affd and
remanded, Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 44 (1st
Cir. 1997); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (discussing the "enlargement of
power" by the Necessary and Proper Clause).
214 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
215 Id. at 1963.
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Clause involves determining whether the statute was "rationally related
to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power."2 16
Nevertheless, several members of the Court have expressed reservations about such a broad reading of what the Necessary and Proper
Clause authorizes. Justice Kennedy, for example, took care to note
the distinction between the deferential rational basis review in the due
process context and rational basis in the Commerce Clause context.2 1 7
The latter, upon which the Court's Comstock opinion relies, requires a
"tangible link" to commerce, not simply a conceivable rational relation. 2 18 Further, Justice Kennedy would place federalism restraints on
the operation of the Necessary and Proper Clause itself; assertions of
federal power under the Clause that intrude upon "essential attributes
of state sovereignty" would suggest "the power is not one properly
within the reach of federal power."2 1 9 Similarly, in Gonzales v. Raich,
Justice Scalia parsed Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement to place
additional restraints on the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Means employed under the Clause must be "appropriate" and "plainly
adapted," but, in addition, they must not be otherwise "prohibited"
and must be "consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution."2 2 0 On Scalia's reading, as evinced in Gonzales and Printz, the
Necessary and Proper Clause does not authorize a law that violates a
constitutional principle of state sovereignty. 22 '
Some have argued that even if a given measure might be "necessary" to carry out a valid legislative objective, federal regulation might
not be the "proper" means of doing so, particularly if Congress has
not determined that state or local regulation would not be sufficient
to achieve that objective. 222 This view was embraced by Justice John
Roberts in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.22 3
There, Roberts concludes that "[e]ven if the individual mandate is
'necessary' to the Act's insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a 'proper' means for making those reforms effecId. at 1956-57 (emphasis added) (citing cases).
See id. at 1966-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 1967.
Id. at 1967-68.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819)).
221
See id.; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
222
See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking ConstitutionalFederalism,74 TEx. L. REv. 795, 800
(1996); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267, 297 (1993); see also Randy E.
Barnett, The OriginalMeaningof the Necessary and ProperClause, 6 U. PA.J. CoNsT. L. 183, 217
(2003) (arguing that, to be "proper," a law must be within the jurisdiction of Congress,
according to principles of separation of powers, federalism, and "background rights retained by the people").
223
See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-93 (2012).
216
217
218
219
220
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tive." 2 24 This portion of the opinion, however, was not joined by any
other Justice. The argument is not only directly at odds with arguments made pursuant to the anicommandeering doctrine-in the
treaty context, it would also seem to fly in the face of the very purpose
of both the Treaty Clause and Compacts Clause, which unequivocally
federalize the treaty power.
Carlos Vdzquez proposes a limit on implementing legislation that
gives some bite to the Necessary and Proper Clause without fundamentally undermining the treaty power. Vdzquez suggests that Congress's power to enact "necessary and proper" implementing
legislation pursuant to a non-self-executing treaty addressing matters
beyond its Article I powers extends only to determinate treaty obligations, not to aspirational treaty provisions.2 2 5 Aspirational treaty provisions typically grant treaty parties broad discretion to implement the
treaty and thus arguably pose the greatest danger of intrusion on
rights reserved to the state. At the same time, they do not create specific obligations binding on the United States with which the federal
government must therefore be able to compel compliance.2 2 6 Thus,
Vdzquez argues, excluding aspirational treaty provisions as a sole basis
for congressional legislative authority preserves the Framers' intent in
declaring the supremacy of treaties22 7 and ensures the United States'
compliance with its international obligations.2 28 As Vdzquez recognizes, there may be challenges in discerning which provisions of treaties are aspirational and which are obligatory.2 29
Thus far, however, the federal courts-including the Third Circuit-have followed the broad reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause set forth in Comstock in upholding implementing legislation. 230
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals drew heavily from the Comstock
opinion and similar circuit court precedent to uphold the Hostage
Taking Act as necessary and proper to implement the Convention
Id. at 2592.
225 See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Missouri v. Holland's Second Holding, 73 Mo. L. REv.
939, 965-66 (2008) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Second Holding].
224

226
227

See id. at 965.
See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.

228

See Vdzquez, Second Holding, supra note 225, at 965.

229
230

See id. at 966.

See, e.g., United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 162 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012) (upholding
under the Necessary and Proper Clause the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act); United States v. Kebodeaux, 647 F.3d 137, 138 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding under
the Necessary and Proper Clause a statute requiring sex offenders to update registration
after intra-state relocation), rev'd, 687 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v.
Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2011) (same); Mead v. Holder, 766 F.
Supp. 2d 16, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding the individual insurance mandate of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act under the Necessary and Proper Clause), affd
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Against Torture. 23 1 Indeed, the court stated that the scope of Congress's powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause are especially
broad in the area of foreign relations.2 3 2 Thus, it appears overall that
current Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence does not significantly limit Congress's power to pass legislation implementing a valid
treaty.
C.

Scope of the Treaty Power

Are there any limits on the treaties the federal government may
conclude or that the courts will enforce? In other words, are there
treaties that are beyond the constitutional grant of authority to the
President to "make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." 233 We address this question here. We proceed by first
outlining how the political question doctrine applies to questions regarding the appropriate scope of the treaty power. Although the doctrine does not act to prohibit the courts from assessing the
constitutional validity of the exercise of the treaty power as a general
matter, the doctrine may be invoked in cases in which there are no
'judicially discernible and manageable standards."2 34 Second, we examine in detail three candidate limitations on the treaty power-subject-matter limits, limits derived from Article I, and limits on
concluding pretextual treaties. We find that only the last of thesethe limitation on pretextual treaties-provides any judicially enforceable limit on the treaty power. We then sketch a much more detailed
pretext test than has previously been articulated in the literature. We
conclude, however, that few treaties will fail even this test. Instead,
the real protections against abuse of the treaty power derive from the
structural, political, and diplomatic checks on the exercise of the
power described in the following Part.
1. Is the Scope of the Treaty Power a Political Question?
The political question doctrine can be traced back to Marbury v.
Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[q] uestions, in
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."23 5 Under
the doctrine, courts abstain from deciding issues either because they
conclude that a certain subject matter has been entrusted entirely to
another branch or because they believe that the judicial process is not
See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 804-05 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 805.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
234 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986), overruled by, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
235
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
231
232
233
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adequate for deciding the issue.2 3 6 The focus, in general, is on separation of powers.2 3 7 The political question doctrine guides our assessment of the judicial tools available for ascertaining whether or not a
given treaty, by virtue of its content, exceeds the authority of the federal government under the Treaty Clause.2 38
The modern doctrine is based on the 1962 decision Baker v. Carr,
in which the Supreme Court decided that federal courts can intervene
in and decide legislative apportionment cases.23 9 Baker established a
six-prong test to guide courts as to whether a case is a political
question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
[(2)] a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
[(4)] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or [(5)] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 240
The first prong of the Baker test requires "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department."2 4 1 In practice, the Court has seldom found this to be
the case.2 4 2 For the most part, federal courts routinely review the con236

See CHARLEs

ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs

86 (7th ed.

2011).
See id.
Questions about the scope of the treaty power differ from those concerning the
process of treaty making, such as whether or not the President may unilaterally abrogate
treaties. The political question analysis may differ on the latter set of questions, which are
largely beyond the scope of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 247-50.
239
See 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962).
240
Id. at 217.
241
Id.
242
The Court has only found such a commitment of an issue to another branch of
government when something in the text can be read as specifically excluding the courts.
Before the Baker test, the Court found such a commitment in the Guarantee Clause. See
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 32, 42 (1849) (refusing to decide which of two
opposing camps was the legitimate government of Rhode Island). Subsequent cases under
the Guarantee Clause have followed Luthers reasoning. See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234 (1917); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118,
129, 143 (1912); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578 (1900); see aSo WRIGHT & KANE,
supra note 236, at 87 ("[T]he Court consistently has refused to resort to the Guaranty
Clause as a constitutional source for invalidating state action."). Other areas held to be
political questions under the first prong of Baker include the impeachment process, Nixon
v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993), and the training of the national guard, Gilligan
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1973) (holding that the Article I, Section 8 "Authority of train237

238
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stitutionality of exercises of Article 1243 and II244 powers. The fact that
these powers are entrusted to other branches does not mean that
oversight of their lawful exercise is outside the responsibility of the
judiciary. The text of the Treaty Clause states only that "[the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur . . . ."245 This is worded as are any other Article I and II powers, which the Court has consistently held subject to judicial review.
There is no allocation, express or implied, of a power to judge the
validity of treaties to either of the political branches. It is highly
doubtful, therefore, that the scope of the treaty power is, as a general
matter, a political question under the first prong of the Baker test.
The second and third Baker prongs require federal courts to abstain from questions that cannot be decided by applying judicial criteria. 246 Perhaps the most important foreign relations case to fall under
these prongs is Goldwater v. Carter, in which the Supreme Court summarily vacated a court of appeals judgment holding that President
Carter could unilaterally terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. 2 4 7 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, stated that "while
the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall
participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body's
participation in the abrogation of a treaty." 2 4 8 Citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wight Export Corp.,2 4 9 the plurality believed that "the justifications for concluding that the question here is political in nature are
2 0
even more compelling .. . because it involves foreign relations . . . ."
The applicability of these prongs of Baker to the treaty power depends
on the workability ofjudicial tests created to define the boundaries of
ing the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress" demonstrates a textual
commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch (citing U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8)).
243
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the GunFree School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause).
244 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582, 589 (1952)
(holding that President Truman lacked authority to seize the country's steel mills in response to a national strike, even given the exigencies of the Korean War).
245
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
246
In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939), for example, the Court declined to
decide how long a proposed constitutional amendment stays open for adoption and
whether a prior rejection bars a state from subsequently ratifying an amendment. The
Court found no constitutional or statutory basis for making a decision, and concluded that
any resolution of these questions would implicate policy concerns that are not properly
within the scope of the judiciary. See id. at 450, 453-54.
247
See 444 U.S. 996, 996-98 (1979).
248
Id. at 1003.
249 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
250
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003-04. But see id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
issue of decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not
political discretion; accordingly, it falls within the competence of the courts.").
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Article II. If a workable test to limit the scope of the treaty power
could be fashioned, then it is unlikely the issue would be a political
question. On the other hand, if any test would ultimately rely on arbitrary distinctions or involve the judiciary in complex foreign policy
determinations, then the second and third Baker factors would preclude judicial review. The next two subsections examine the workability of various judicial tests to limit the scope of the treaty power.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth prongs of the Baker test all address the
prudential consideration that there are times when it is imperative for
the government to speak with one voice. Historically, these prudential factors seem to have been relatively inconsequential. We are not
aware of any Supreme Court case that has declared an issue a nonjusticiable political question based on prudential grounds alone. Nonetheless, if there were an area in which the Court would hold an issue
nonjusticiable on prudential grounds, foreign relations is a strong
candidate. In Haigv. Agee, ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the Court,
opined that "[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention."25 1
Rather, they are "so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." 25 2 Note that requiring that treaties adhere to affirmative limitations set by the Constitution is much less invasive to the political
branches than imposing extratextual subject-matter or procedural
limitations on the treaty power. As such, it is possible that the latter
would invoke the prudential prongs of the political question doctrine
while the former would not. Yet the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Medellin v. Texas,2 53 against briefing by the United States, 25 4 suggests that the current Court is unlikely to be moved by prudential concerns in the treaty context regarding the "lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government"25 5 or the "embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question."2 5 6
If a court were to declare the scope of the treaty power to be a
political question, it would likely do so under the second and third
prongs of the Baker test on the grounds that there are insufficient 'judicially discernible and manageable standards."2 5 7 It is therefore with
453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).
Id. (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)).
253 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008).
254
See Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984).
255
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
256 Id.
257
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986), overruled by, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
251

252
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an eye toward identifying such standards that we now turn to three
possible substantive limits on the treaty power.
2.

Proposed Boundaries on the Treaty Power

The scope of the treaty power has long been a subject of debate.
Three limitations on the treaty power have received sustained attention from the courts and scholars. First, some have argued that Article
II treaties are constrained by subject-matter limitations-that they may
only address subjects of "international concern." There is, however,
no consensus on where or how to draw the appropriate boundaries, if
indeed those boundaries are appropriate for judicial inquiry at all.
Second, a minority of commentators have suggested that the scope of
the treaty power should be limited to Congress's enumerated powers
under Article I, thus subjecting the treaty power to precisely the same
federalism restrictions that apply to ordinary domestic legislation.
This remains, however, a novel proposition with few adherents and
little legal support. The third and most plausible proposed limitation
on the treaty power is a prohibition on the power of the federal government to enact a purely pretextual treaty-one that serves as a pretext for the federal government to pass a law that it would otherwise
be unable to pass.
Although the third limitation has strong scholarly consensus behind it, thus far no one has provided clear guidance as to what the test
entails or how to apply it. We attempt to fill that gap. Drawing on
purpose tests in other contexts, we describe a test that courts could
apply to determine whether a treaty is solely pretextual. Although this
test, if adopted by courts, would prevent purely pretextual treaties
from being enforced, we ultimately conclude that few treaties will in
fact fail this test. The real limits on the treaty power thus come not
from any court-enforced limitations but from structural, political, and
diplomatic checks inherent in the treaty power itself-checks to which
we turn in the following Part.
a.

Subject-Matter Limits

It has often been asserted that an Article II treaty may only address subjects of "international concern." 2 5 8 James Madison raised
this idea during the ratification debates. 25 9 It was also mentioned in
Justice Field's opinion in Geoftoy v. Riggs, which noted that treaties
258 This specific phrase initially appeared in an address to the American Society of
International Law by Charles Evans Hughes. See Hughes, supra note 98, at 194, In 1965, it
was incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States as one of only two proposed limitations on the treaty power (the other being that a
treaty could not violate affirmative constitutional rights). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

STATEs
See supra text accompanying note 33.

FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED

259

§ 117(a) (1965).
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must address issues "which [are] properly the subject of negotiation
with a foreign country." 26 0 Holland itself contains dicta suggesting that
Blackstone accepted this limitation.2 6 1 The D.C. Circuit in Power Authority of New York v. FederalPower Commission strongly implied that Arti-

cle I treaties are limited by subject matter.26 2
The nomenclature of "subject-matter limitation" obscures the fact
that there are actually three different types of limitation to which the
label can be attached. The apparent consensus around this limitation
is therefore more lexical than analytical: different commentators appear to have different limits in mind when they discuss the topic.
These limits can stretch from those that are so permissive that they are
limits only in name to those that are so constrictive that they would
involve U.S. withdrawal from the majority of modern day treaties. The
basic claim that the treaty power is restricted by "subject matter,"
therefore, allows for such variance in practical limitations that, without more, it provides little or no guidance. It is therefore important
to distinguish between the various limitations nominally in this
category.
The first subject-matter limitation candidate involves restricting
the Article II treaty power to those subjects about which a valid treaty
can be formed under international law. Such a formulation only requires that the treaty have a suitable co-signatory and have international legal effect. 2 6 3 It could encompass a treaty with provisions that
are exclusively domestic.2 6 4 Although some scholars have described

260 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). An even earlier statement of a similar
view comes in Holden v. joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872) (noting that the treatymaking power extends to "all those objects which in the intercourse of nations had usually
been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation and treaty").
261
Missoui stressed how state interests could be subordinated in "matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). It
described the subject of the treaty as a "matter( I requiring national action." Id. Indeed,
the Migratory Bird Treaty involved a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude."
Id. at 435. It could "be protected only by national action in concert with that of another
power." Id. The specific justification for the validity of the treaty therefore was that the
national interest required it and that a treaty was the only means of implementing an
effective regulatory scheme; in effect, the treaty was valid because it involved a valid international subject matter.
262
See Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
vacated sub nom., Am. Pub. Power Ass'n v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 355 U.S. 64 (1957);
see also United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Admittedly, there must be
certain outer limits, as yet undefined, beyond which the executive's treaty power is constitutionally invalid." (citations omitted)).
263
See HENKIN, supra note 61, at 184-85.
264
It is likely that a treaty with Mexico to create gun-free zones near schools in both
countries would be a valid treaty under international law since Mexico, as an independent
sovereign state, is a valid treaty partner and both parties would undertake that the provisions be binding as a matter of international law.
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such a rule as a subject-matter limitation, 265 it does not actually impose any subject-linked restriction on which treaties the United States
may enter.26 6 As discussed below, international law places almost no
limit on the validity of a treaty so long as a state can find a willing
treaty partner.2 67 This "limitation" therefore places few practical restraints on the treaty power and vests significant authority in the political branches to use the power prudentially. It is, therefore, both
uncontroversial and unlikely to have much impact.
A second type of subject-matter limitation specifies the particular
subjects that treaties may address. For example, treaties could be limited to matters that typically constituted treaties in 1791268 or to a set
of issue areas that have a long lineage in the state practice of treaty
making, such as treaties regarding commerce, territory, and defense. 2 69 Perhaps novel types of treaties, like environmental or
human rights agreements, could move from being outside of the subject matter scope to being within it, depending on evolving international custom. 2 70 This approach, which involves the pre-specification
of particular subject areas, is the most literal vision of a "subject-matter
limitation." However, because it involves limits that are fundamentally
265
Henkin notes that a treaty must be "a bona Fide treaty [which] deals with a foreign
nation about matters which pertain to our external relations, that are of mutual international concern." HENKIN, supra note 61, at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
language is suggestive of a subject-matter limitation to topics of "international concern."
However Henkin later clarifies that international law provides the only significant limit on
the treaty power:
If there are reasons in foreign policy why the United States seeks an agreement with a foreign country, it does not matter that the subject is otherwise
'internal' . .. or that-apart from treaty-the matter is normally and appropriately . .. within the local jurisdictions of the States.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
266 The only sense in which international law might be said to provide a subject-matter
limitation is the requirement that no treaty can violate a jus cogens norm. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
267 See infra Part IIIA.3.
268
Curtis Bradley suggests that this restriction was the one intended by Thomas Jefferson. See Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 142, at 451.
269
It appears this was the view advanced by Charles Evans Hughes, referenced in Part
1. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Hughes believed that the treaty power is not
"intended to be exercised . .. with respect to matters that have no relation to international
concerns." In particular, the federal government cannot use the power to "control matters
which normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the States."
Hughes, supra note 98, at 194-96. While this text alone gives us no sense of what Hughes
had in mind, we do know that Hughes believed that the United States was not constitutionally authorized to join a treaty to establish uniform principles of private international law.
See Charles Evans Hughes, The Outlook for Pan Americanism-Some Observations on the Sixth
InternationalConference of American States, 22 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 1, 12 (1928).
270 Though an interesting proposition, there has been little written about such an "evolutionary" approach to the subject-matter limitation. This might be because such a restriction of the treaty power would preclude the United States from a being norm leader in
novel areas of international cooperation.
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inflexible, it risks severely limiting the capacity of the United States to
engage in treaty making and is not adaptable to novel areas of international cooperation. It also relies on an untenable distinction between
domestic and international "subject matter." Since almost all treaties
touch on both international and domestic affairs, this rule has the
significant potential to be under- or overinclusive. 2 7 1 It also confers
significant discretionary authority upon the institutional actor
charged with determining which subjects are valid ones for the purposes of the treaty power. And it flies in the face of the Framers' clear
intent to grant the federal government a treaty power that was not
limited to particular subjects precisely to allow for evolution over
time.2 7 2
A third possibility scholars have raised is that a treaty's subject
must be related to the United States' foreign policy goals. Such a restriction would allow treaties to be enacted only on subjects that could
plausibly require international coordination or reciprocity. Valid treaties would need to be related to some objectively discernible foreign
policy interest and not merely designed to regulate domestic behavior. This third formulation was largely endorsed in the Second Restatement of the Law of U.S. Foreign Relations.2 7 3 The Second
Restatement specifies that treaties can only be concluded on subjects
of "international concern," which are described as matters that "relate
to the external concerns of the nation as distinguished from matters
of a purely internal nature."2 74 These are "not confined to matters
exclusively concerned with foreign relations," but they must further
United States foreign policy in some tangible and discernible fashion.2 75 Unlike the previous subject-matter limitation, this subject-matter limitation does not pre-specify a narrow range of subjects upon
which treaties can be concluded, nor does it risk excluding all treaties
that have domestic implications. It must, however, pre-specify a particular set of legitimate foreign policy goals around which valid treaties can be formed. The Second Restatement provides two examples
of valid treaties that help define the limits of the government's power:
271
See United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[The] dichotomy between
matters of purely domestic concern and those of international concern ... [is] appropriately criticized by commentators in the field.").
272 See sufrca Part I.A.1.
273
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 117 (1965). The Second Restatement is clear that "[u]sually, matters of international
concern have both international and domestic effects, and the existence of the latter does
not remove a matter from international concern." Id. § 117 cmt. b. Indeed, the Second
Restatement clarifies that a treaty which provides "that no national of either [state] may be
denied permission to practice accountancy in the other state by reason of alienage," an
ostensibly internal matter, would be within the treaty power. Id. § 117 cmt. b, illus. 3.
274 Id. § 117 cmt. b.
275 Id. (emphasis added).
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First, the restatement notes that it would be constitutional if "State A
and the United States make a treaty providing that no national of either country may be denied permission to practice accountancy in the
other state by reason of alienage."27 6 Second, it notes that it would
also be constitutional if "State A and the United States, whose territories adjoin, make a treaty providing for specified closing hours of saloons and bars located within fifty miles of the border between
them." 2 7 7 The foreign policy goals in these examples are extremely
direct and tangible, conferring material benefits on particular U.S. citizens or regions.
If these examples were to represent the outer limits of the treaty
power, this type of subject-matter limitation would be a significant
one. For example, while a reciprocal treaty based on alienage clearly
confers specific material benefits on U.S. citizens abroad, most human
rights treaties are expressive in character and cannot be said to materially benefit any particular group of U.S. citizens. It is possible that
the restatement's illustrations are designed not to be outer limits but
merely typical examples. This, however, raises another concern with
this limitation-that it may involve intractable problems of line drawing. For example, would it be permissible to regulate the closing time
of bars that are 200 miles from the border? Is there a distance between 50 and 200 miles where regulating closing times is no longer an
issue of international concern? If so, it seems impossible to know
where such a line could be fairly and logically drawn. Finally, the Restatement gives no guidance as to how a court may discern whether
the federal government's desire is a legitimate foreign policy goal. If a
foreign policy goal is simply what the political branches say it is, then
policing this limitation becomes a de facto political question. If, on
the other hand, this limitation involves an actual determination made
by courts as to which foreign policy goals are legitimate or important
enough to be described as proper subjects of the treaty power, then
this limitation risks becoming arbitrary or inconsistent. A test that
uses foreign policy goals as its subject matter touchstone, therefore,
has the potential to both heavily restrict legitimate international treaties and involve the judiciary in irresolvable line drawing problems.
Perhaps it is for these reasons that the Third Restatement rejected the Second Restatement's formulation.2 7 8 The Third Restatement explains that, "[c]ontrary to what was once suggested, the
276
277

Id. § 117 cmL b, illus. 3.
Id. § 117 cmt, b, illus. 4.

278

The Third Restatement contains expansive language suggesting that the treaty

power is unlimited by subject matter and limited only by the scope of international law:
"The references in the Constitution presumably incorporate the concept of treaty and of
other agreements in international law. International law knows no limitations on the purpose or subject matter of international agreements, other than that they may not conflict
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Constitution does not require that an international agreement deal
only with 'matters of international concern."' 2 7 9 Although there remains some debate over whether there ought to be any substantive
limits on the treaty power, 280 even scholars who support limiting the
treaty power admit that "the new Restatement (Third) position . .. is now

being treated as if it were black-letter law" and that the "rejection of a
subject matter limitation on the treaty power now appears to be the
accepted view, at least among academic commentators." 28 1 As a result, it is unlikely that courts today would reject a treaty as insufficiently international in nature.28 2 Therefore, subject-matter limits are
unlikely to place any real constraints on the exercise of the treaty
power.
b.

Article I

A minority of commentators have suggested that the scope of the
treaty power should be limited to Congress's enumerated powers
under Article 1.283 This would "subject the treaty power to the same
federalism restrictions that apply to [ordinary legislation]. "284 The desire for such a limitation is grounded in the desire to restrict the
power the Treaty Clause grants the federal government over the
states. If "the form and substance of modern treaty law resembles domestic legislation,"2 8 5 Professor Curtis Bradley has argued, then the
restrictions on treaty law should also mirror those on domestic
legislation. 286
with a peremptory norm of international law. . . ." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 154,

§

302 cmt. c.
279 Id. The Restatement adopted the position of its chief reporter, Louis Henkin. See
Louis Henkin, "InternationalConcern" and the Treaty Power of the United States, 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 270, 276-78 (1969).
280 Compare Golove, supra note 9, at 1287-89 (supporting general subject-matter limitations requiring advancement of foreign policy interests), with Bradley, Treaty Power Part I
supra note 142, at 450-61 (advocating for "reserved powers" limitations on the treaty power
instead of subject-matter limitations).
281 Bradley, Treaty Power Part I, supra note 142, at 432-33 (footnote omitted).
282 Curtis Bradley notes that it "seems inconceivable that courts would second-guess
[the political branches], which presumably would require an examination of either the
national interests of the United States, the subjective beliefs of the U.S. treatymakers, or
both." Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 142, at 107. David Golove concurs that
courts "cannot be expected to second-guess the political branches on the question of
whether a treaty deals with a matter that is sufficiently international in nature." Golove,
supra note 9, at 1291.
283 See, e.g., Bradley, Treaty PowerPart I, supra note 142, at 393; cf. Peter J. Spiro, The
States and InternationalHuman Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 576 (1997) ("One might go
so far as to question whether the treaty power now encompasses a federal capacity to overcome state laws in spheres of traditional state authority . . . .").
284 Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 142, at 456.
285
286

Id.
See id.
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The claim is novel and has weak support in constitutional text
and history. There is little reason to believe that the Framers would
create an entirely separate procedural mechanism for passing treaties-one subject to its own set of structural, political, and diplomatic
checks-if there was nothing that could be achieved through the
treaty power that was not already possible through ordinary legislation. As Part I shows, a significant motive behind the creation of the
Article II Treaty Clause was to ensure that the new United States could
speak with unity on the international stage and live up to its treaty
commitments irrespective of the views of a few recalcitrant states.2 m1
Those who advocate restricting the scope of the treaty power to
the limits of Article I do not dispute the novelty of the idea. But they
argue that the similarity between modern day statutes and treaties necessitates the restriction.2 8 8 Since modern treaties create domestic law
in a way never envisaged in 1791, they argue, modern treaties provide
an opportunity for the federal government to abuse the treaty power
to further its domestic agenda that the Framers never considered.2 8 9
As shown in Part I, however, the Framers understood that the
uses of the treaty power would change over time, and that is precisely
why they declined to place subject-matter limits on the power.29 0
There is no evidence that they believed the treaty power would remain
cabined to a narrow range of issues, neatly divorced from domestic
legislation. Quite the opposite. If there really was no possibility that
treaties could encroach on states' rights, then there would be no reason to create an alternative mechanism for their ratification, one that
was especially sensitive to the views of the states. Moreover, limiting
the treaty power to the confines of Article I would overturn the specific holding of Holland. Those who advocate this idea are therefore
proposing a rule that does not comport with text and history and that
contradicts well-settled precedent. 29 1 In sum, this proposed limitation
is likely to remain confined to the academic literature.

287 See supra Part I.A. 1.
288 See Bradley, Treaty Power Part II, supra note 142, at 456-58.
289 In particular, in light of changes in the landscape of international law post-Missouri,
not least the proliferation of human rights treaties after World War II, there may be an
argument that "facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (citation omitted).
290
See supra Part L.A.
291
A few commentators have suggested ways to re-read Missouri so as to allow for
Tenth Amendment limits notwithstanding the opinion's apparently explicit rejection of
such limits; specifically, one reading views Missourias making the applicability of the Tenth
Amendment to treaties more flexible and subject to change over time. SeeJay LoydJackson, The Tenth Amendment Versus the Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the United
States, 14 VA. L. Rav. 331, 351-52 (1928).
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Pretext

A final limitation on the treaty power is a prohibition on the
power of the federal government to enact a purely pretextual treaty. A
treaty may not, in other words, serve as a pretext for the federal government to pass a law that it would otherwise be unable to pass.
Although there is no evidence that any treaty has in practice been
purely pretextual, there is academic consensus that such a treaty, were
it to exist, would be unconstitutional. Louis Henkin states that, for a
treaty to be valid, it must be "a bona fide agreement, between states,
not a 'mock-marriage."' 2 9 2 David Golove agrees that "the President
and Senate may not constitutionally enter into a treaty for the sole
purpose of making domestic legislation."29 3 Chandler Anderson
claims treaties must be made pursuant to "the international interests
or relations of the nation" and cannot be made "as a mere subterfuge
for exercising . .. power."29 4 Duncan Hollis notes that scholars generally "do not . .. endorse 'mock marriage' treaties designed primarily

to regulate domestic standards." 295 Indeed, no scholar anywhere appears to openly admit that the treaty power can be lawfully used as a
pretext to pass domestic legislation. 296 While this consensus appears
universal, it is almost exclusively addressed in footnotes and incidental
to the authors' main arguments. It is notable that a universally agreed
upon pretext limitation on the treaty power has received almost no
direct scholarly attention or careful examination.
Scholars have also been unclear about how this limitation operates in practice. Louis Henkin makes the argument that international
law provides a check against pretextual usage of the treaty power. He
notes:
[H]ypothetically, if in order to circumvent the House of Representatives and the states, the President wrote a uniform divorce law, applicable to the United States alone, into 'a treaty', [sic] and the
Prime Minister of Canada cooperated in the scheme . - ., it would

presumably not be a treaty under international law, and therefore
29 7
not a treaty under the Constitution.
292 HENKIN, supra note 61, at 185.
293 Golove, supra note 9, at 1090 n.41 (citation omitted).
294 Chandler P. Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power Under the
Constitution, 1 Am. J. Ir'L L. 636, 665 (1907).
295 Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: ForgingNew Federalist Constraintson the Treaty
Power, 79 S. CA.. L. REv. 1327, 1337 n.56 (2006) (citation omitted).
296 That includes one of the authors of this Article. See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1344
(arguing that treaties must be "genuine" and that "a treaty concluded for the sole purpose
of enabling a party to avoid its domestic lawmaking rules would not constitute a genuine
agreement." (footnote omitted)).
297 HENKIN, supra note 61, at 185 (footnote omitted).
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However, it is possible that such a treaty would constitute a valid agreement under international law, 298 and even if it did not, it would certainly be a lawful treaty if Canada undertook to reciprocally
implement the divorce law. Hence, international legality is not dispositive of whether a treaty is or is not pretextual.
Moreover, no scholar is especially clear on how a prohibition on
pretextual treaties would be judicially enforced in domestic courts.
Many appear to suggest that whether a treaty is pretextual is a political
question. Robert Looper notes that "[e]ven in the case of bilateral
treaties, it would be difficult to secure judicial review of the question
[of whether a treaty was pretextual]."299 David Golove largely avoids
the issue: "Whether a constitutional limitation of the kind I have suggested would be judicially enforceable, and, if so, to what extent and
under what circumstances, are wholly separate questions [from the
ones addressed here]."300 Other scholars do not even discuss the judicial enforceability of treaties,30 ' while some scholars reject the notion
that there should be any judicial role whatsoever in treaty enforcement. As Thomas Healy puts it, "the unique role of the Senate in
ratifying treaties provides the states adequate political protection in
the treaty-making process, making judicial intervention unnecessary
and inappropriate."30 2
Scholars have been all too willing to ignore this critical area,
which might hold the key to resolving lingering anxieties about the
scope of the federal government's power under the Treaty Clause.
Since advocates of states' rights are primarily concerned with the judicial enforceability of treaty restrictions and are most worried about the
covert extension of Article I powers, a judicially enforceable "pretext
test" would allay many of their fears. Yet, unlike a test that limits the
treaty power to the limits of Article I, a "pretext test" would comport
with the Constitution's structure and history. There is little doubt that
the treaty power was never intended as a way for the federal government to make an end run around the limits of Article I and to implement legislation with a solely domestic purpose. A workable pretext
test, with judicially manageable standards, would therefore address
abiding and warranted concerns about the scope of federal power
298 States may, after all, engage in unilateral treaties or declarations which are binding
as a matter of international law. See Alfred P. Rubin, The InternationalLegal Effects of Unilateral Declarations,71 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-6 (1977).
299 Robert B. Looper, Limitations on the Treaty Power in FederalStates, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045, 1058 (1959).
300
Golove, supra note 9, at 1090 n.41.
30
See generally Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty Is a Treaty Is a Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 51
(1992) (discussing the difference between domestic and international application of treaties but avoiding the judicial enforceability of treaties).
302 Healy, supra note 141, at 1747.
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while preserving the national government's freedom and flexibility on
the international stage. It is to this project that we now turn.
3.

A Two-Step Test for Identifying Clearly Pretextual Treaties

Here, we aim to set out a new pretext test-one that identifies
judicially manageable standards. In doing so, we are mindful of the
purpose tests that have recently proliferated in Supreme Court jurisprudence-in areas such as the Equal Protection Clause,3 0 3 the Takings Clause,30 4 the Establishment 3 0 5 and Free Exercise3 0 6 Clauses,
substantive due process, 30 7 and political gerrymandering.3 0 8 Richard
Farrell argues that courts tend to employ purpose tests when there is
"reasonable disagreement about what the Constitution means or how
it ought to be applied. Otherwise divergent views and theories often
converge on the conclusion that statutes enacted for certain purposes
offend the Constitution."3 0 9 Thus, purpose tests represent a "lowest
common denominator" between divergent constitutional
viewpoints.3 10
We begin by noting two broad classes of difficulties inherent in
designing a pretext test: the first involves the difficulty of discerning
the true intent or motivation behind the enactments of a multimember deliberative body (call these "evidentiary considerations"), and
the second involves the deference that federal courts owe the political
branches due to separation of powers (call these "separation-of-powers considerations"). We then propose a two-step test to unearth unconstitutional purposes. The first step is a threshold inquiry into
whether the treaty entails domestic legislation beyond the scope of
Congress's enumerated powers. If it does not, then the inquiry ends
and the treaty passes constitutional muster. If it does, the inquiry
moves to a second step: a rational basis test in which the court asks
whether there is some valid international purpose for the treaty. If
there is, then the treaty passes the pretext test. If there is not, then
the treaty should be ruled unconstitutional. In practice, the number
of treaties that would fail the test will be exceedingly small. Nonetheless, the test offers a mechanism to address the possibility-albeit the
303
304
305
306

See,
See,
See,
See,

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
Lemon v, Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.

(1976).
477-78 (2005).

(1971).
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,

540-42 (1993).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127, 142-43 (1986), overruled by, Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
309
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 89 (2001).
310
Id. at95 ("The Justices may be able to agree on purpose tests as a device for implementing the Constitution, even when they cannot agree about what the Constitution
means.").
307
308
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small possibility-that treaties might be used to evade constitutional
limits on the federal government's lawmaking authority.
a.

Challenges to Designinga Pretext Test

Modern purpose tests attempt to determine the actual, as opposed to the declared, motive of the legislature in passing a statute by
examining evidence external to the text. In particular, courts consider themselves freer than in the past to examine legislative history
and the circumstances surrounding the passing of the statute.3 1' In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,3 12
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, declared that judges could validly
investigate the hidden motivations behind legislative acts, as they had
done in the past with administrative agencies. The Court remarked
that "[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available."313 In hunting for
racially discriminatory intent, judges could consider the "sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision" as well as the "legislative
or administrative history."3 14 The Court has similarly turned to legislative history and surrounding circumstances in examining legislative
motivation in women's rights cases,3t 5 Establishment Clause cases,3 16
Free Exercise Clause cases,"17 and many others.3 1 8
One possible approach to treaties would be to apply a strong pretext test that scrutinizes actual motivation as in Arlington Heights. However, such a probing pretext test raises a host of difficulties. To begin
with, it is difficult to discern the true intent or motivation behind the
enactments of a multimember deliberative body. There are at least
three evidentiary difficulties that cast into question the ability of
courts to discern actual legislative motivation. First, it seems all but
impossible to tease out the hidden and multifarious motivations of
individual legislators. Often, legislators voice one motive but are
secretly driven by another. Moreover, people often act with more
311 See Caleb Nelson, judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784,
1850-57 (2008) ("[Mlodern courts routinely consult internal legislative history and other
sources of information that their predecessors considered off-limits.").
312 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
313
Id. at 266.
314
Id. at 267-68.
315
See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318-20 (1977) (per curiam); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-51 (1975).
316
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587, 591-93 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985).
317
See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
541-42 (1993).
318
See Nelson, supra note 311, at 1855-59 (noting that legislative history plays a prominent role in deciding cases about the dormant Commerce Clause, the Ex Post Facto and
Bill of Attainder Clauses, and the constitutional right to travel).
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than one motive.3 19 Second, it seems at best a fiction to attribute a
single intent to the enactments of a multimember body. 320 Even if
one can determine the motives of individual legislators, how many
would have to vote for a bill with impermissible motives to invalidate
it?321 The more rigor one demands in ascertaining the collective motivation of a legislature, the more the quest risks incoherence. Third,
legislative history and the records of the circumstances surrounding
legislation tend to be inconclusive and manipulable.322 Moreover, the
fact that courts are willing to scrutinize legislative history to spot unconstitutional motives might itself make legislators less candid in
debate.3 2 3
Addressing these difficulties with regard to legislation rather than
treaties, Richard Pildes argues that examination of legislative history
to discern purpose does not require judges to discern the individual
motives of legislators. Rather, judges can simply rely on accepted
methods of purposive statutory interpretation, which include examining legislative history to determine Congress's intent.3 24 Leaving to
one side general critiques of purposive statutory interpretation, there
remains a crucial difference between purposive interpretation and
scrutiny for unconstitutional legislative purpose. While purposive interpretation is fundamentally an act of deference to the legislature,

As Justice Scalia notes in his dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard:
[W] hile it is possible to discern the objective "purpose" of a statute (i.e., the
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth . . . discerning
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. The number of possible motivations, to
begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite.
482 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
297, 323 (1997).
321
See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Having achieved ... an assessment of what individual legislators intended, we must still confront the question (yet to be
addressed in any of our cases) how many of them must have the invalidating intent.... Or
is it possible that the intent of the bill's sponsor is alone enough to invalidate it-on a
theory, perhaps, that even though everyone else's intent was pure, what they produced was
the fruit of a forbidden tree?").
322 See id. ("Legislative histories can be contrived and sanitized, favorable media coverage orchestrated, and postenactment recollections conveniently distorted.").
323 See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1215 (1970); accord Scott W. Breedlove & Victoria S. Salzmann, The Devil
Made Me Do It: The Irrelevance of Legislative Motivation Under the Establishment Clause, 53 BAYLOR L. REv. 419, 443 (2001).
324
See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role ofExclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 729 n.45 (1994) ("[T]he process is one of constructing a
narrative account that provides the most convincing explanation of the reasons that an
action has been taken-just as with any judicial act of purposive statutory interpretation.").
319
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purpose scrutiny is an act of skepticism.325 Purposive interpretation
examines legislative history because, come what may, courts must construe the statute to mean one thing, and reliance on often treacherous legislative history is better than nothing when the text is
completely indeterminate. Purpose scrutiny, on the other hand, looks
for unconstitutional purposes when they are not apparent on the face
or effects of a statute. This difference might require one to engage in
the impossible task of examining the individual motives of legislators
because often a statute passed with a legitimate public justification
might be tacitly motivated by unconstitutional designs.32 6
Moreover, the stakes for purpose scrutiny of legislative history are
much higher than for purposive interpretation. Under purposive interpretation, should the Court misinterpret a statute, Congress can
always pass a law clarifying its meaning after the fact. Yet if the Court
mistakenly strikes down a statute due to an unconstitutional motive,
such a holding cannot be reversed by the political branches and is
likely to become entrenched. 327 For these reasons, a higher level of
certainty is appropriate in the context of purpose scrutiny than in purposive interpretation.
A second challenge to developing a pretext test is found in separation-of-powers doctrine. Separation-of-powers considerations counsel particular deference to the political branches in questions
involving the treaty power. First, in almost all modern cases that use
explicit purpose tests to strike down a statute, federal courts are invalidating state statutes. There are very few modern cases in which the
Supreme Court has struck down an act of Congress explicitly due to
an unconstitutional motive. 28 Richard Fallon notes that courts are
often hesitant to accuse legislatures of acting for an illicit reason for
fear of insulting them.3 29 Federal courts have been even more careful
325
See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87 ("While the Court is normally deferential to a
State's articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose
be sincere and not a sham.")
326
See Ely, supra note 323, at 1213-14.
327
See Calvin Massey, The Role of GovernmentalPurposein ConstitutionalJudicialReview, 59
S.C. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (2007) (noting that Congress's purpose is irrelevant in matters dealing with the Commerce Clause, taxation, and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
328
See id. at 12-16. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), might be
one such example. Although the Court nominally employed a rational basis test, it found
no such rational basis and found evidence in the legislative history that Congress passed
the food stamp regulation in question to discriminate against hippies. The Court concluded that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 534. Formally, it is possible that if the
Court had found a rational basis, it would have overlooked the evidence to the contrary in
the legislative history. This is speculative, though. For further discussion on Moreno, see
infra text accompanying notes 355-59.
329
See FALLON, supra note 309, at 92; see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1091, 1285

296

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:239

about assessing the motivations of coordinate branches of the federal
government.
Moreover, as noted in our earlier discussion of political question
doctrine, courts traditionally defer to the political branches in issues
of foreign affairs,3 3 0 often declining to review "[m]atters intimately
related to foreign policy and national security."3 3 1 In United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp.,332 Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court,
quotes with approval the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in pronouncing negotiations with foreign nations to be under the constitutional authority of the President:
The President is the constitutional representative of the United
States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns
with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be
urged with the greatest prospect of success. For his conduct he is
responsible to the Constitution.3 33
Sutherland also raises prudential concerns that counsel for freeing
the President from statutory restrictions in negotiating matters of foreign affairs: the government's need to speak with one voice to avoid
international embarrassment and the President's superior access to
sensitive information relevant to international negotiations. 3 3 4 These
two concerns are generally thought to apply to the courts as much as
to Congress.
Both the evidentiary and separation-of-powers considerations
counsel for a fairly deferential test in searching for pretextual uses of
the treaty power. Given the legal and prudential reasons for the judiciary to defer to the political branches in matters of foreign affairs, we
posit that courts should be fairly certain that the political branches are
acting with an unconstitutional motive when they strike down treaties.
Moreover, whenever possible, courts should avoid all appearances of
an interbranch political struggle. Due to evidentiary difficulties in determining the actual intent of Congress through legislative history and
circumstances surrounding enactment, it may be virtually impossible
to reach the requisite level of certainty. Thus, a direct pretext test that
closely examines legislative history and other circumstances surrounding the political process might be inadequate to the task of ferreting
out pretextual treaties. Moreover, the very act of putting the political
(1986) (noting that the Court hesitates to engage in motive review because of the fear of
falsely accusing state officials of improper purpose).
330
See supra Part ILCA.
331
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).
332
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
33
Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
334
See id. at 320.
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branches' motives on trial could harm the United States' credibility in
negotiating with foreign powers.
Richard Fallon notes that certain substance tests are designed to
"smoke out" unconstitutional purposes when direct purpose tests
might be too difficult to administer or too politically sensitive.3 35
Under the Equal Protection Clause, for example, heightened scrutiny
for suspect classifications is driven in part by the consideration that
statutes that differentiate on certain bases are likely to serve unconstitutional purposes.3 3 6 In particular, the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, "though formally framed in suspect-content terms,
manifests a clear preoccupation with what the Court takes to be constitutionally forbidden purposes."33 7 Two themes in affirmative action
are clearly purpose-based: first, although the government has a compelling interest in remedying past injustices, it cannot constitutionally
engage in race-based redistribution for its own sake;3 38 and second, it
is important to subject affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny to
uncover such redistributive motives. 3 39
b.

The Two-Stage Inquiry

The challenges to designing an appropriate pretext test are significant but not insuperable. Here we consider the form a purpose
test might take in the treaty context. An appropriate judicial test of
the treaty power would strike down only treaties that are clearly
supra note 309, at 92.
See id.
337
Id. (citing David Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 24-26).
338
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995); City of Richmond
v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 307 (1978).
339
See Pena, 515 U.S. at 226-27; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Content neutrality in free
speech doctrine seems similarly purpose-driven:
[Ilt may sometimes be permissible . . . for the government to enact a relatively broad ban, such as a prohibition against all picketing close to elementary schools, but not to enact a narrower regulation that would actually
permit more speech, such as a prohibition against all picketing except labor picketing.
FALLON, supra note 309, at 92 (footnote omitted); see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 115 (1972) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting picketing near a school); Police
Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (striking down an ordinance prohibiting
picketing within 150 feet of a school during class hours unless the school is involved in a
labor dispute); Elena Kagan, PrivateSpeech, PublicPurpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CI. L. REv. 413, 443-45 (1996) (discussing how contentneutral laws, as well as content-based laws, can lessen the ability to speak); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 55-56 (1987) (discussing the difficulty courts face in determining if legislatures have acted to limit speech). The most likely
explanation for this is a presumption about unconstitutional purposes. The government
bans specific content in order to shield citizens from certain ideas. See FALLON, supra note
309, at 92; Kagan, supra, at 450-51.
335

336

FALLON,
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pretextual while avoiding any unnecessary appearance of discord
among the branches of government. To meet these criteria, we propose a two-step test that examines substance to unearth unconstitutional purposes. The first step is a threshold inquiry into whether the
treaty entails domestic legislation beyond the scope of Congress's Article I powers. If not, then the inquiry ends because any law that falls
within the limits of Article I is a fortiori within any reasonable federalism limitations on the treaty power. The second step is a rational basis
test in which the court asks whether there is some valid international
purpose for which the treaty could plausibly have been passed. This
test would incorporate elements of the Court's more rigorous applications of rational basis, such as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Centero40 and Romer v. Evans.34 1 Under such standards, a treaty would
not pass scrutiny if grossly ill tailored to meet any plausible international purpose. The thrust of this second step is that courts should
not strike down treaties unless they are reasonably certain that there is
no legitimate international purpose that could have driven it, in which
case it would clearly be a pretext for passing domestic legislation.
i. First Step: The Threshold Inquiry
In examining any treaty, courts should first decide whether the
treaty is one that even raises reasonable suspicion of pretext. They
should do this by asking whether, had the treaty been passed as domestic legislation, it would exceed Congress's Article I powers. If the
domestic requirements of a treaty could have been passed as Article I
legislation, then it is highly unlikely that the political branches are
using a treaty as a pretext to circumvent federalism limits on the powers of Congress.34 2 If there is no suspicion of pretext, then the court
can uphold the treaty without further inquiry or embarrassment to
the political branches. The vast majority of treaties would pass this
inquiry with no difficulty. Moreover, the transparency and predictability of the threshold inquiry would likely deter most frivolous litigation, minimizing the chance the treaty process would be held up in
the courts.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
342
In theory, it is possible to have a treaty that is pretextual that nonetheless falls
within Article I powers. One can imagine that legislators might want political cover for
passing unpopular legislation, and perhaps passing legislation required by a treaty might
be more politically explainable than voting for pure domestic legislation. Alternatively,
perhaps a piece of legislation has overwhelming support in the Senate but lacks votes in
the House. Would such pretextual uses of the treaty power violate the Constitution?
These are legitimate concerns that could raise important separation-of-powers questions.
They do not, however, raise the federalism concerns tackled in this Article; such uses of the
treaty power are not pretexts for usurping the authority of the states.
340
341
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Second Step: InternationalPurpose and "RationalBasis with
Bite"

For those treaties that exceed Article I powers under the threshold inquiry, the court should then apply a "reasonable international

purpose" test. The court would consider whether there is any benefit
to concluding an international agreement as opposed to enacting domestic legislation. This inquiry into the benefit of concluding an international agreement ought to be broadly conceived, including
securing foreign cooperation, solving a collective action problem, or
strengthening shared normative commitments.3 4 3
In determining whether a treaty is sufficiently connected to a reasonable international purpose, courts can utilize a rational basis test.
This merits some clarification as scholars generally agree that, although the Court does not acknowledge that it is doing so, it applies
at least two distinct types of rational basis test, one significantly less
deferential than the other.3 44 Traditionally, rational basis is an extremely deferential standard, developed as it was in CaroleneProductsto
reverse the Court's practice of striking down federal economic regulation under the Equal Protection Clause. 3 4 5 Under traditional rational
basis, the Court does not demand that defenders of a law present its
actual purpose, but any conceivable or hypothetical "legitimate pur-

343
Human rights treaties, even if they have no enforcement mechanism, articulate
international standards that carry significant moral authority. Those standards can be used
to induce change in domestic governments or to lock in existing domestic standards
against future deviation. If countries merely enacted these standards in domestic legislation, they would lose this mutual reinforcement effect. See Oona Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFucr RESOL. 588, 592-94 (2007).
344 See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-BasisReview and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WAsH. L. REv. 281, 282 (2011) [hereinafter Farrell, Two Versions of RationalBasis Review] ("Although rationality review purports to be one standard, it has two faces
that use different methods and produce conflicting results."); Robert C. Farrell, Successful
Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Courtfrom the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND.
L. REv. 357, 358 (1999) [hereinafter Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims] ("This results
effectively in two sets of rationality cases, one deferential and one heightened . . . .");
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 482 (2004) (referencing
"two seemingly distinct approaches"); Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERIY 897, 897 (2005) (noting the "blatant-but unacknowledged-misapplication of the test in select cases to achieve preferred outcomes");
Richard B. Sapphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591 passim (1999) (noting the existence of a second order
rational basis review); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 INo. L.J. 779, 780 & n.11 (1987) (noting the insertion of "teeth"
in the rational basis test in certain instances); Nancy M. Reininger, Note, City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center: Rational Basis with a Bite?, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 927 passim (1986)
(arguing that the Supreme Court sometimes uses a "rational basis with bite" test).
345
See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.

300

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:239

pose." 3 4 6 Furthermore, in identifying a "rational relationship" between the law and a "legitimate purpose," the Court does not look for
an actual relation but merely one that a reasonable legislature could
have believed. Under this deferential standard, the Court need not
examine evidence of purpose or factual relationship.34 7 "[T]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it"3 4 8-a virtually impossible burden to meet, as any law could have an infinite number of post
hoc justifications.3 4 9
In an article that endeavors to survey all of the Court's rational
basis decisions from 1973 to May 1996,350 Robert Farrell notes that
100 out of 110 cases were decided in favor of the defendant.3 5 ' Fallon
argues that the ten plaintiff cases were decided under a more rigorous
standard. 35 2 In the plaintiff victories, the Court looked for evidence
of the real purpose of the law and examined the record to determine
whether there was an actual connection to a legitimate purpose.35 3 In
determining actual purpose, the Court might have examined several
aspects of the record, including "a statement of purpose within the
statute itself, . . . [the] legislative history,

. .

. the effects of a law, . . .

[and] the historical background [and sequence of events] leading up
to the adoption of a law . . . ."354 The Court applied a particularly
aggressive rational basis test in United States Department of Agriculture v.
346 See Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims, supra note 344, at 359 ("[Tjhe Court
does not insist that the defenders of the law identify the actual purpose of the law, but
rather, only a conceivable, and sometimes hypothesized, purpose." (footnote omitted)).
347 See id.
348 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Lehnhausen v. Lake Store Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
349
For example, in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), the Court
upheld a New York City traffic regulation that banned advertising on vehicles unless the
vehicle was engaged in the business it advertised. The Court hypothesized that the local
authorities may have concluded that vehicles that advertised their own businesses posed
less of a traffic problem than those that advertised third-party businesses and declined to
evaluate evidence that such a judgment actually took place or could be supported by any
facts. Id. at 110 ("The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise
their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem in view of the
nature or extent of the advertising which they use. It would take a degree of omniscience
which we lack to say that such is not the case."). Moreover, although the Court observed
that the billboards in Times Square posed a greater traffic hazard than advertising on
vehicles, it did not see underinclusiveness as a problem under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. ("It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated
or none at all." (citation omitted)).
350 See Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims, supra note 344, at 416.
351
Id.
352
See id. at 357-58, 411 ("Since the Court is ordinarily so deferential in rationality
cases, what is it about the ten cases discussed in this Article that required a different kind of
scrutiny and a different result?").
353
See id. at 360.
354 Farrell, Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review, supra note 344, at 288-89 (footnotes
omitted).
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Moreno, in which it struck down a regulation denying food stamps to
households containing unrelated persons.35 5 The Court began by
looking at the Food Stamp Act's purposes-strengthening the agricultural economy and alleviating hunger and malnutrition 3 56 -and
found that Congress's classification was "clearly irrelevant" to both.3 5 7
It then examined the sparse legislative history and found a conference
report reference and a Senate floor statement suggesting that the
amendment's purpose was to exclude hippies.3 8 The Court then invalidated the amendment because "a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest." 5 9 Thus, the Court applies more stringent standards when it wants to strike a measure down but is unwilling to resort
to heightened scrutiny.
For a rational basis test to have legitimacy, it must apply the same
standards regardless of the outcome. To devise an appropriate rational basis test for the treaty power, it is important to give the test
teeth with which to strike down obviously pretextual treaties but not to
make the test so stringent that it amounts to de facto heightened scrutiny. On the one hand, the plaintiff's burden of refuting every conceivable legitimate purpose under traditional rational basis seems all
but impossible. On the other hand, evidentiary and separation-ofpowers considerations counsel against scrutinizing legislative history
for illicit purposes. Our proposed approach would allow courts to examine the record to search for possible legitimate purposes (but not
for illicit ones) and for evidence of a connection between the measure
and any legitimate purpose put forward. A court should credit any
legitimate purpose advanced in the record-even a post hoc rationalization-to which the treaty happens to be reasonably well suited. A
court should be able to strike down a treaty only if it finds the treaty
grossly ill tailored to any legitimate purpose available in the record.
Thus, the Court shows appropriate deference to the political branches
and uses legislative history, unreliable as it is, only to give them the
benefit of the doubt. The standard for showing pretext does not require refuting every possible legitimate purpose, but it does require
showing that none of the purposes forwarded in the course of the
litigation is rationally related to the measures in the treaty.

413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
See id. at 533-34 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1971)).
357
Id. at 534.
358 See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.); 116 CONG. REC.
44439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)).
355

356

359

Id.
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City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cente6o and Romer v. Evans36
point to the possibility of striking such a balance. In both cases, state
government measures particularly burdened a defined group of citizens, all the while stating a neutral rationale. The Court applied a
rational basis test. However, unlike in traditional rational basis, the
Court demanded not only that there be a legitimate government purpose but also that the law's relationship to that purpose not be so
attenuated or ill tailored as to betray pretext.3 6 2 As Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, reasoned in Romer, "[b]y requiring that the
classification bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."3 63 In
both Cleburne and Romer, the Court abstained from using legislative
history to find evidence of unconstitutional motivation but took into
account social realities in assessing the rationality of the state measures. Both cases considered justifications offered by the government
bodies, but both relied exclusively on the text and the anticipated impact to impugn those justifications. The "rational basis with bite"3 6 4
requirement allowed the Court to see the obvious fact that the stated
rationales for state measures in both cases were mere pretexts for
prejudice against mentally disabled individuals3 65 and animus against
gays and lesbians.3 66
To illustrate by example, consider the facts in Missouri v. Holland.
The Court would have begun with the threshold inquiry of whether
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act exceeded the Article I powers of Congress. It evidently did, as shown by the earlier federal district court
decision striking down the Weeks-McLean Act.3 67 This would have
prompted the Court to examine whether or not the treaty and its implementing legislation were rationally related to a reasonably conceivable international purpose. Clearly they were: preserving a migratory
species that passes through both countries is a reasonable interna360
361
362

473 U.S. 432 (1985).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).

See id. at 635 ("The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from [the State's]
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them."); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 ("The
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational." (citations omitted)).
363 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (citation omitted); see also Cleburne, 472 U.S. at 450 ("The
short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded . . . .").
364
Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims, supra note 344, at 358 (crediting Gerald

Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Tenn-Fonvard:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a NewerEqual Protection,86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 12 (1972), with identifying the
Court's use of "a heightened rationality review with 'bite'").
365
See id at 300-01.
366
See id. at 301-02.
367
See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
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tional purpose, and a treaty with Canada evidently served this purpose. If for some reason the Court had had trouble discerning a valid
international purpose from the face of the treaty, it could have turned
to the record and to legislative history in particular for guidance. If,
however, the United States had signed a treaty with Canada regulating
hunting of the migratory birds only in the United States, the Court might
have still identified a valid purpose (cooperating to preserve the species) but would have likely found the means employed (a one-sided
treaty) so ill tailored to the putative purpose as to fail rational basis
scrutiny. Assuming that no other legitimate purposes advanced in the
record were better related to the means employed, the Court could
have struck the treaty down as pretextual.
The combination of an expansive international purpose requirement and a moderate "rational basis with bite" requirement avoids the
invasive and perhaps impossible task of discerning the political
branches' actual motivation while allowing courts to examine substance to strike down treaties that it can demonstrate with reasonable
certainty are pretextual.
One might criticize this proposed test as smuggling through the
back door what we earlier rejected as unworkable-a subject-matter
test. Indeed, the third variation on the subject-matter test requires
that valid treaties must be rationally related to some objectively discernible foreign policy goal.368 Yet the pretext test is more specific
and limited than the subject-matter test in that it is specifically designed to strike down only treaties passed as pretexts for domestic legislation beyond Congress's Article I powers. First, it has no need to
examine a treaty that, regardless of subject matter, is almost certainly
not pretextual. Second, the pretext test only asks whether a treaty
fulfills some legitimate international purpose available in the record
Only clearly pretextual exercises of the treaty power would fail to pass
this test.
This raises a second criticism: It seems that most pretextual treaties are likely to have some legitimate international purpose available
in the record. What is the point, then, of a pretext test that would fail
to prevent many, indeed perhaps any, treaties? The pretext test as
outlined here does have an important sphere of application. Occasionally, laws do get passed whose justifications are so obviously
pretextual that they fail serious rational basis tests. City of Cleburne and
Romer are cases in point. The ability of the courts to step in when the
political branches are so far afield of rational constitutional behavior
is a valuable safeguard against abuses of government power.

368

See supra text accompanying notes 273-77.
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At the same time, we agree that the role of the courts is extremely
limited even in applying the pretext text. Indeed, as we have seen in
this Part, the courts in general play a very limited role in checking
excessive uses of the treaty power. The most significant protections
against abuses of the treaty power are not found in court-enforced
doctrines. Instead, the real checks are embedded in the Treaty Clause
itself. These checks are the subject of the next Part.
III
STRUCTURAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC CHECKS
As the preceding discussion reveals, debates over the scope of the
treaty power have erupted periodically throughout U.S. history, from
the Founding through the present. These debates reveal a persistent
unease with the expansive scope of the Treaty Power and its potential
to encroach on state sovereignty, undermining the principles of federalism. In recent years, these federalism concerns have once again
risen to prominence.
And yet, the worst fears of those concerned with the treaty
power's potential to infringe on state sovereignty have largely failed to
materialize.3 69 In the decades following Holland, the federal government made no attempt to use the treaty power to push through New
Deal legislation that the Court would likely strike down.37 Similarly,
in the post-World War II era, the government did not seize upon the
new generation of human rights treaties to usurp traditional areas of
state regulation. Indeed, in no case since Holland has a court found
that legislation that would otherwise be an invalid exercise of federal
power was valid on the basis of the treaty power alone.37 1 Given the
opportunity provided by the Court in Holland, it might even be considered puzzling that the political branches have apparently declined
Justice Holmes' invitation to expand their power through the Treaty
Clause.
There is an obvious answer to this puzzle, however, and it is the
key to understanding why the courts have had few occasions in the
course of our history to address the legitimate scope of the treaty
power. Put simply, the exercise of the treaty power is subject to substantial internal constraints-structural, political, and diplomaticthat effectively regulate the federal government's use of that power,
rendering court-enforced legal checks largely unnecessary.
These checks internal to the functioning of the Treaty Power
have created nuanced mechanisms for accommodating federalism val369
370

371
(2008).

See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.I.
See Peter J. Spiro, Resurrecting Missouri v. Holland, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1029, 1029
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ues without court involvement. The accommodation takes two forms:
what we call top-down federalism and bottom-up federalism. Topdown federalism occurs when the federal government intentionally
abstains from intruding on state sovereignty by modifying or withholding consent from treaties that implicate core federalism values. Bottom-up federalism occurs when states have asserted an independent
role in the international lawmaking process, becoming active players
in the process of generating international law. The result is a flexible
system in which federal and state governments interact to preserve the
boundary between their respective areas of sovereignty.
A.

Internal Constraints on the Treaty Power

Internal constraints on the treaty power fall into three broad categories. First are the structural checks written into the Constitution by
the Framers. The Framers crafted the Treaty Clause's advice and consent requirement with the express purpose of giving the states a voice
in the treaty-making process and screening out treaties that failed to
garner widespread support. Second are the ordinary political checks
of democratic governance. These checks encourage elected
lawmakers to use their power consistent with their constitutional authority and with widely held views about federalism. Third are the
diplomatic checks inherent to treaty making. The process of negotiating and concluding an agreement with a foreign sovereign necessarily
tempers the potential for abuse of the treaty power. Here we review
each of these constraints in turn.
1.

Structural Checks

The Framers were acutely aware that the treaty power would have
serious implications for states' rights. As discussed in Part I, delegates
to the Philadelphia Convention and the various State ratifying conventions voiced concerns that the federal government would unfairly
favor regional interests or, worse, that it would use the Treaty Clause
to "dismember the empire."3 72 The memory of the proposed treaty
with Spain, which would have sacrificed important Southern interests
in favor of Northern industry, was fresh in their minds.3 73
At the same time, they recognized the necessity of a unified national treaty power to the fledgling nation's ability to conduct its international affairs.3 74 The solution they devised was not to create
judicially enforceable limits on the treaty power but rather to give the
states a direct voice in international lawmaking through the structure
372
373
374

3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 509 (statement of George Mason); see supra Part I.
See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1276-85.
See supra Part I.A.2.
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of the Treaty Clause.37 5 Thus, the requirements of that Clause were
crafted precisely to answer federalism concerns.3 7 6
First, the Framers chose to grant a role in treaty making to the
Senate, whose members they understood to be the representatives of
the states.377 The small states insisted on vesting this power in the
Senate so that they would have an equal voice in treaty making.3 78
Moreover, because the senators answered directly to the state legislatures, they could be trusted to guard the states' institutional prerogatives against federal encroachment. For example, James Madison
remarked that because "[t]he Senate will be elected absolutely and
exclusively by the State legislatures," it "will owe its existence more or
less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel
a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too
obsequious than too overbearing towards them."3 79 Similarly, Alexander Hamilton argued that "the senators will constantly be attended
with a reflection that their future existence is absolutely in the power
of the states. Will not this form a powerful check?"3 s0 Through their
375 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1282 (noting that the Constitutional Convention
gave shared treaty-making power to the President and the Senate, widely seen as representing the states).
376
See Golove, supra note 9, at 1135 (stating that the Framers recognized that treaties

affected state interests and therefore vested part of the treaty-making power in the Senate);
see also Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1282-84 (explaining that the Framers crafted the Treaty
Clause to ensure that a minority of states held a veto over any proposed treaty in order to
address federalism concerns).
377 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond
the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implicationsfor
Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 165, 176-79 (1997) (explaining the envisioned institutional role of the Senate in the eyes of the Framers).
378 William R. Davie explained at the North Carolina ratifying convention that the
small states' concerns

4

THE

made it indispensable to give to the senators, as representatives of states,
the power of making, or rather ratifying, treaties. Although it militates
against every idea of just proportion that the little state of Rhode Island
should have the same suffrage with Virginia, or the great commonwealth of
Massachusetts, yet the small states would not consent to confederate without an equal voice in the formation of treaties.
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION AS REcOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN

1787,

at

120 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1859) [hereinafter 4 DEBATES] (statement of William R.
Davie at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention).
379
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison).
380
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION

AT PHILADELPHIA IN

1787, at 317-18 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1859) [hereinafter 2 DEBATES] (Statement of
Alexander Hamilton at the New York Ratifying Convention); see also Solomon Slonirn, CongressionalExecutive Agreements, 14 COLuM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 434, 436 (1975) ("[T]he full record of the Constitutional Convention . . . demonstrates quite convincingly that the
underlying consideration prompting the delegates to vest the treaty-making power in the
Senate was the desire of the States to retain maximal control over foreign affairs.").
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representatives in the Senate, therefore, the states would retain a bulwark against federal overreach.
Second, the Framers required that a treaty garner the support of
a hefty two-thirds of Senators present.3 8 1 As discussed previously, this
requirement ensured that a determined minority could defeat any
proposed treaty.38 2 This would prevent the federal government from
enacting a treaty that sacrificed the interests of a minority of states in
favor of those of a slim majority, as had been threatened in the defeated treaty with Spain.3 83 More fundamentally, the difficulty of gaining the assent of two-thirds of the Senate would guard against bad
faith exercises of the treaty power and guarantee that a treaty could
pass only with widespread support38 4
Third, the Framers divided treaty-making authority between the
President and Senate so they would serve as checks on one another.
No treaty could pass without gaining the support of both political
branches. James Wilson, for example, argued that, "[n]either the
President nor the Senate, solely, can complete a treaty; they are
checks up on each other, and are so balanced as to produce security
to the people." 8 5 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney argued that "political
caution and republican jealousy rendered it improper for us to vest
[the treaty power] in the President alone."386 Similarly, James
Madison insisted: "Here are two distinct and independent branches,
which must agree to every treaty."3 8 7 Thus, the President and Senate,
with their different interests and constituencies, would serve as checks
on one another.
The view that structural checks are the primary federalism safeguard is not unique to international lawmaking. Herbert Wechsler
famously argued that, even in the domestic arena, the courts have little role to play in enforcing federalism because "the national political
process in the United States . . . is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the
states."38 8 Wechsler pointed out that any act of Congress bears the
imprimatur of the states because of their role in selecting the memSee U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
See supra Part I.A.1.
383
See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; see also Hathaway, supra note 9, at
1281-86 (explaining the circumstances surrounding the defeated treaty with Spain).
384
See Vdzquez, Second Holding, supra note 225, at 964.
385
2 DEBATES, supra note 380, at 507 (statement of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention).
386
4 DEBATES, supra note 378, at 265 (statement of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney at the
South Carolina ratifying convention).
387
3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 347 (statement ofJames Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention).
388
Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. Rtv. 543, 558 (1954).
381

382
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bers of the legislative and executive branches. The Senate in particular, due to the equality it affords to large and small states, "cannot fail
to function as the guardian of state interests as such."3 8 9
The Supreme Court briefly adopted Wechsler's view in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, in which it upheld the Fair
Labor Standards Act against a Commerce Clause challenge.39 0 Citing
Wechsler, the Court argued that, "the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the States
inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself,
rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority."39 1 Wechsler's insight is even more relevant to treaties than to
ordinary legislation because of the enhanced role of the Senate and
the supermajority requirement.
In the domestic context, Wechsler's thesis has not gone unquestioned. In recent decades, the Court has abandoned Garcia'sdeferential posture and has reasserted the judicial role in policing
federalism.3 9 2 Furthermore, Wechsler's critics have argued that the
political process is effective at protecting some, but not all, of the federalism interests enshrined in the Constitution. Larry Kramer, for example, argues that Wechsler failed to draw the crucial distinction
between "ensuring that national lawmakers are responsive to geographically narrow interests, and protecting the governance prerogatives of state and local institutions."3 93 The Seventeenth Amendment,
389
Id. at 548. He concluded by arguing for judicial deference to Congressional interpretation of federalism: "[T]he Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interest of the states, whose
representatives control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly acquiesced
in sanctioning the challenged Act of Congress." Id. at 559 (footnote omitted); see alsoJESSE
H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROcEss: A FUNCTIONAL RECON.

SIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 176 (1980) ("Numerous structural aspects

of the national political system serve to assure that states' rights will not be trampled . . . .");
Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? FederalPower vs. "States'Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70
U. COLO. L. Rev. 1277, 1308 (1999) ("[T] he Constitution principally safeguards state interests not through judicially enforceable sovereignty federalism barriers, but through various
mechanisms that give states a disproportionate voice in framing federal policy.").
390 See 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
Id. at 552. It concluded that judicial scrutiny is generally unnecessary: "State sover391
eign interests ... are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id.
The Court proceeded to uphold the Act on the basis of "respect for the reach of congressional power within the federal system." Id. at 557.
392 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601, 613-14 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power when it provided remedies for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence and that the judiciary ultimately determines what
activities "come under the constitutional [Commerce Clause] power of Congress"); see also
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invalidating Congress's Gun-Free
School Zones Act for falling outside the bounds of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
393 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the PoliticsBack into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 215, 222 (2000); see also Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the
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which provided for the popular election of senators3 9 4 arguably removed the structural incentive for Senators to be solicitous toward
state institutional prerogatives.39 5
However, although the Senate is now elected directly, senators
are still of course representatives of their states; they are elected, after
all, by a statewide electorate, and must be responsive to the desires of
their constituency. It is far from clear that the proper federalism concern is with the interests of state legislatures than it is with state electorates. Moreover, the supermajority requirement in treaty making
provides an additional level of protection for state interests. Any proposed treaty must convince two-thirds of the senators not only that it is
substantively advantageous to the United States but also that it is an
appropriate exercise of federal power. Treaties, moreover, are created by the Senate and President alone (the House of Representatives
is excluded from the process)-hence, states each have equal representation in the treaty-making process.39 6 A minority of senators holding particularly strong views on states' rights, therefore, could derail a
treaty, even one that enjoyed overwhelming majority support. Indeed,
if anything, the process is too protective of state interests.3 9 1
2.

Political Checks

In addition to the structural checks specific to the Treaty Clause,
the federal government's treaty making is, of course, subject to the
usual political check-reelection. Any President engaging in blatant
abuse of the treaty power could suffer serious political repercussions.
The Framers relied in part on the President's nationwide constituency
as a political check. For example, George Nicholas of Virginia argued: "The consent of the President is a very great security. He is
elected by the people at large. He will not have the local interests
which the members of Congress may have. If he deviates from his
duty, he is responsible to his constituents."3 98 Likewise, one third of
the Senate faces reelection every two years and so is frequently held
Political Safeguards of Federalism,46 VILL. L. REv. 951, 954-56 (2001) (noting that vertical
and horizontal aggrandizement are additional distinctions that one can draw between the
threats to state sovereignty).
394 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed
of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote.").
395
See Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme
Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 671, 673 (1999) (arguing that,
prior to the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate, then "elected by
popularly-elected state legislatures," protected federalism).
396
See U.S. CONST. art. 11. § 2, cl. 2.
397
See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1307-38.
398
See 3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 240 (statement of George Nicholas of Virginia).
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accountable for its activities.3 99 According to James Madison, the Senate's biennial turnover meant that a President seeking to abuse the
Treaty Power could not long "seduce a part of the Senate to a participation in his crimes." 40 0 Thus, according to the Framers' design,
democratic political checks would work in tandem with the structural
features of the Treaty Clause to constrain the federal government
within permissible exercises of its authority.
The political checks have been extremely effective in preventing
all but those few treaties with overwhelming support from being submitted to and approved by the Senate. This effect can be seen, first, in
the small number of Article II treaties approved each year. From 1997
to 2010, the United States entered a mere 202 Article II treatiesaveraging roughly fifteen per year. 40 ' Moreover, the number of treaties approved each year has remained roughly flat since the Founding
of the country despite an immense increase in other forms of international lawmaking. 402
The role of political checks in protecting federalism concerns can
also be seen in the kinds of treaties that are more likely to be approved or rejected. Our empirical research of recent treaty practice
in the United States suggests that if it is difficult to gain approval for
an Article II treaty in the Senate, it is even more difficult to gain approval of treaties that might pose federalism concerns. 403 The bare
statistics might at first suggest that the Senate does little to screen treaties-it approved 202 of the 216 treaties (94%) transmitted by the
President from 1997 through 2010.404 However the disaggregated
data presents a more complex picture. 405
First, the Senate is less likely to approve global, multilateral treaties-a class of treaties for which federalism concerns are most frequently raised. 406 Of the 216 treaties transmitted from 1997 through
399
400

401

See id. at 516 (statement of'James Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention).
Id.
These figures are derived from the Library of Congress THOMAS database. Search

Treaties, LIBRARY OF CONGREss THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.

html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
402 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1288.
403 We compiled a database of every treaty submitted to the Senate from the 105th
through the 111th Congress. Using the Library of Congress THOMAS database and the
Government Printing Office Congressional Documents website, we coded each treaty for
ratification status and multi- versus bilateral status. See id.; CongressionalDocuments, GPO
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?

collectionCode=CDOC&browsePath=108&isCollapsed=true&leafLevelBrowse=false&ycord
=0 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
404 See CongressionalDocuments, supra note 403.
405
406

See id.

This assumption is typical in analysis of treaty data. See, e.g., David Sloss, International Agreements and the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1963, 1984-85
(2003) (highlighting that the passage rate for multilateral treaties is significantly lower
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2010, seventy-one were global, multilateral treaties; of those seventyone, the Senate approved only nine unconditionally.407 Moreover,
eleven of the fourteen treaties to which the Senate did not consent
were multilateral agreements. 40 8
Second, the political checks' effectiveness can be seen in the
United States' participation in the twenty-five "core group of multilateral treaties"409 identified by the U.N. Secretary General as "most central to the spirit and goals of the Charter of the United Nations."4 1 0
These global, multilateral treaties-over half of which relate to
human rights-are often cited as posing particular federalism concerns. Of those twenty-five treaties, the President has signed twenty
(80%), and submitted seventeen (68%) to the Senate. The Senate
gave its advice and consent to only twelve (48%), and placed explicitly
federalism-oriented Reservations, Understandings, or Declarations
(RUDs) on four of the treaties it approved.4 1 ' Of the eight "core treaties" the United States has joined without federalism RUDs, six relate
to armed conflict or genocide and so are unlikely to interfere with
state interests.4 12 The remaining two treaties have been tailored to
avoid conflicts with state sovereignty. In ratifying the U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification, the Senate added an understanding
that "no changes" to existing laws "will be required to meet [U.S.]
obligations under Articles 4 or 5 of the Convention"-namely, those
than the rate for bilateral treaties). Indeed, concerns about global human rights treaties
and the United Nations were the impetus for the Bricker Amendment. See Spiro, supra
note 371, at 1031; supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
407 Unconditional treaties are those accepted without Reservations, Understandings,
or Declarations (RUDs). RUDs, of course, are not a perfect measure of the Senate's concern for states' rights because they may concern issues unrelated to federalism. See Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilitiesfor Incorporation of Human Rights
Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 262 (2001) (suggesting that proponents of
RUDs may not attempt to preserve state rights because ratification of RUDs occurs with the
advice and consent of the Senate, not the House). Nevertheless, the presence of RUDs
reflects the Senate's reluctance to accept treaties that interfere with existing law.
408 These figures are derived from the Library of Congress THOMAS database. See
Search Treaties, supra note 401.
409 MultilateralTreaty Framework: Core Group of MultilateralTreaties Deposited with the Secretary-GeneralRepresentative of the Organization'sKey Objectives, THE MILLENNIUM ASSEMBLY OF
THE UNITED NATIONs: SECRETARY GENERAL, http://www.un.org/millennium/law/treaties.

htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
410 Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen., to the Millennium Assembly of the
United Nations (May 15, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/law/sgletter.
htm.
411
These data are based on our research in the United Nations Treaty Collection
database and the Library of Congress THOMAS database. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited
with the Secretaiy-General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2012); Search Treaties, supra note 401.
412 See Multilateral TreatiesDeposited with the Secretary-General,supra note 411; Search Treaties, supra note 401.
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articles affecting domestic law.413 The final treaty, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, has a "Federal Clause" within the text of
the treaty specifying that its obligations apply only to the federal government, which is required to make a "favourable recommendation"
to its constituent states but need not enact binding law to ensure their
compliance.4 1 4 Thus, at every stage of the treaty negotiation and ratification process, the political checks operated to screen out treaties
for which federalism concerns were most likely to be raised.
It appears, therefore, that the Treaty Clause's requirements continue to provide a robust check against the treaties where federalism
concerns are most salient. The Senate is sensitive to federalism concerns and has proven willing to block, delay, or impose limiting conditions on treaties likely to impinge on state sovereignty. In this
environment, it is unlikely that a treaty designed solely to usurp state
power could both gain the President's endorsement and survive the
rigorous test of senatorial advice and consent.4 15 Political actors concerned with their reelection have a strong incentive not to be perceived as transgressing the limits of their constitutional authority.
This powerful check, built into the Treaty Clause by the Framers, remains an effective limitation on the treaty power.
3.

Diplomatic Checks

A further check on the treaty power is the necessity of finding a
treaty partner. Article II treaties, unlike domestic legislation, "must
have the consent of a foreign nation."4 1 6 That nation must be willing
to bind itself publicly to the terms of the treaty, thereby exposing itself
to international legal liability. Thus, the requirement of finding a
treaty partner serves as an independent constraint on the federal government's exercise of the treaty power.4 17 Most important, it poses a
significant obstacle to any attempt to use a treaty as a "mock mar413

United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification,UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLEC-

TION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXVII-10&
chapter-27&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (scroll down to "Declarations").
414 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. VI, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267. In addition, the transmittal package for the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, which is currently under consideration in the Senate, includes an
express federalism RUD. Letter of Transmittal, UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, S. Treaty Doc. No. 112-7, at 1 (2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CDOC- 12tdoc7/pdf/CDOC-1 12tdoc7.pdf.
415 See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1312 ("It is clear that an extraordinary level of consensus is required to conclude an Article II treaty.").
416

THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE COMPOSED ORIGINALLY

FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES § 52,

rprinted inJEFFERSON'S PARLIAMEN-

TARY WRITINGs 420 (Wilbur S. Howell ed., 1988).
417
See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1344 ("The necessity of a foreign partner willing to

enter an agreement of mutual interest serves as both a justification for and a limit on the
treaty power.").
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riage" 4 1 8-a pure pretext for circumventing domestic law limitations.
In such cases, the United States would likely have difficulty finding a
willing treaty partner.4
First, any potential treaty partner would face serious reputational
consequences both at home and abroad from entering into this type
of "mock marriage." Its government would risk being viewed as a
weak player by other nations. Its leaders, if perceived as overly deferential to U.S. interests, would risk losing domestic political support. 420
It is likely that those reputational consequences will, in most cases,
outweigh any pressure or inducement from the United States.
Second, even a willing treaty partner would be subject to domestic procedural checks on its ability to enter a treaty with the United
States. Most states provide for the same procedural checks on international lawmaking as they do on domestic lawmaking. As of 2007, 124
countries required the same voting threshold in the legislature for
treaties as for domestic laws. 421 Fifty-nine countries, including the
United States, had different voting thresholds for treaties than for domestic laws in at least one house of the legislature.4 22 But all these
countries-the vast majority of the world's nations-require at least a
majority of one house of the legislature to ratify a treaty, and many
require more. 423 Thus, any proposed pretextual treaty would face the
additional barrier of the treaty partner's domestic political system.
Even if the United States could persuade a foreign government to
enter a pretextual treaty, therefore, it is unlikely that the foreign government could clear the domestic procedural hurdles necessary to ratify that treaty.
To be sure, the diplomatic check is not a complete or perfect
check. There might be instances in which the executive might per418
419

HENKIN, supra note 61, at 185.

Mark Tushnet has pointed out the absurdity of this scenario:
One must imagine U.S. officials approaching some foreign partner, saying,
"Look, could you do us a favor? We want to do something, (for example,
regulate land use, or eliminate the death penalty for juveniles) that the
Supreme Court won't let us do on our own. But if you sign on to an agreement that obligates us to do it, then everything would be hunky-dory under
our Constitution." . . . Why would the negotiating partner simply do the
U.S. treaty-makers a favor?
Mark Tushnet, Federalismand InternationalHuman Rights in the New ConstitutionalOrder, 47
W'AYNE L. Riv. 841, 862 & n.99 (2001).
420
See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Ci-u. L. REv. 469, 503 (2005) ("Where powerful political constituencies in
the state have staked out a clear position on issues related to the treaty, the government
knows that domestic political support will be affected by the decision to commit to or
refrain from committing to the treaty.").
421
See Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1272.
422
See id.
423
For a comparative summary of domestic procedures for international lawmaking,
see Hathaway, supra note 9, at 1271-74.
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suade another country to sign a treaty in an effort to circumvent our
constitutional structure. Yet, these cases are likely to be rare. Combined with the other checks on the treaty power-particularly the
structural and political checks described above-the need to find a
treaty partner serves a constraint on the federal government's ability
to enter treaties whose true purpose is to enable domestic legislation
beyond the scope of the enumerated powers.
B. Federalism Accommodation in Practice
The system of structural, political and diplomatic checks described above accommodates federalism values without judicial intervention. First, there is top-down federalism accommodation: The
political branches abstain from entering treaties that might intrude
on the domains reserved to the states, even when they have the constitutional authority to do so. They do so by modifying the treaty language or by withholding consent from international treaties that
implicate federalism. Second, there is bottom-up federalism accommodation: The states themselves assert an independent role in international lawmaking, particularly in traditional areas of state
sovereignty. Together, these systems of federalism accommodation effectively protect federalism values.
1. Top-Down Federalism
Early treaties that failed to achieve the consent of the Senate for
federalism reasons show how the Constitution's structural and political checks protect federalism interests from the top down. Consider,
for example, the 1824 Slave Trade Convention with Great Britain. In
response to the growing humanitarian movement in the United States
and pressure from Great Britain, the House had passed a resolution
urging President Monroe to negotiate a treaty with the European powers for the suppression of the slave trade. 4 24 The resulting agreement
declared slave trading an act of piracy and gave the parties a mutual
right of search and capture in the other's territorial waters.42 5 President Monroe submitted it to the Senate on April 30, 1824, expecting
it to sail through the ratification process.
However, some Senators from the southern states were wary of
the Convention, believing it to be the first step toward abolishing slavery in the states. 42 6 This concern for states' rights, combined with parSee W. STULL Hour, TREATIEs DEFEATED BY THE SENATE 41-42 (1933).
See Richard E. Webb, Treaty-Makingand the President'sObligationto Seek the Advice and
Consent of the Senate with Special Reference to the Vietnam Peace Negotiations, 31 OHIO ST. L.J.
490, 497-98 (1970).
426 See id.
424
425
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tisan rancor, put its prospects for ratification in serious doubt.4 2 7
Upon learning that the Convention was foundering in the Senate,
Monroe transmitted a special message pleading with the Senate: "It
cannot be disguised, that the rejection of this convention cannot fail
to have a very injurious influence on the good understanding between
the two governments on all these points." 4 2 8 The next day, the Senate
ratified the Convention. However, it had amended the treaty so as to
assure that it would never gain the assent of Great Britain. Whereas
the original version provided for reciprocalrights of search and capture, the amended version only provided those rights in the British
territories of the West Indies and the neutral coasts of Africa, and not
in the waters off the United States.42 9 The Senate had succeeded in
defeating a treaty that would potentially encroach on state
sovereignty.
Another example is the series of treaties governing the property
rights of aliens, another traditional area of state regulation. These
treaties sought to remove the discriminatory inheritance laws in place
in many European countries and U.S. states. The Supreme Court had
ruled in the early nineteenth century that the federal government had
authority to grant equal property rights to aliens through treaty, and
the United States entered forty-four such treaties between 1778 and
1860.430 However, the government did not make use of the full extent
of its power under the Treaty Clause to regulate aliens' property
rights. Only eight of those treaties guaranteed aliens equal right to
inherit and possess property. The remainder provided only that
where state law disqualified aliens from inheritance of real estate, they
would be allowed to sell it within a given period. 43 '
Moreover, as states' rights concerns became more prominent toward the end of that period, the Senate increasingly asserted its role as
the guardian of their interests against federal encroachment. The
first example was the Senate's refusal to ratify an 1835 convention
with Switzerland, which would have allowed an alien heir "reasonable
427
See HoLT, supra note 424, at 46. Holt argues that political maneuvering rather than
"fear of abolition" was the Senate's real motive. Id. However, he recognizes that that fear
played a role. Quoting a British observer, he writes: "Three causes combined to excite this
opposition. Disinclination to concede the right of search; apprehension of ulterior measures being in contemplation by Great Britain for effecting the total suppression of slavery
in all Countries, and thirdly and principally, Party Spirit." Id. at 48.
428
Id. at 45.
429
See id. at 45-46.
430
See Hayden, supra note 64, at 567-68.
431
See id. at 568; see also Virginia V. Meekison, Treaty Provisionsfor the Inheritance of
PersonalProperty, Consideredwith Reference to Clark v.Allen, 44 AM.J. INT'L L. 313, 319 (1950)
("Treaty provisions regarding real property were . . . carefully phrased to preserve the
traditional right of a State to determine for itself who could and who could not acquire
and hold land in its jurisdiction, but at the same time to protect the alien beneficiary from
monetary loss.").
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time" to dispose of property that the heir was barred by state law from
inheriting.4 3 2 In 1847, the Senate unanimously ratified a similar convention with Switzerland regulating only property rights. 4 33 However,
only a few years later, the United States negotiated a general treaty of
friendship, commerce, and extradition with the Swiss confederation.
In 1850, President Fillmore submitted the treaty to the Senate with a
message asking them to strike out the clause granting Swiss citizens
equal rights to hold real estate: "This is not supposed to be a power
properly to be exercised by the President and the Senate .

. .

. The

authority naturally belongs to the State within whose limits the land
may lie." 4 3 4 The Senate proceeded to strike out the terms relating to
real property, leaving only the provisions relating to personal property
intact. The Swiss returned the treaty with amendments providing that
in those states where aliens could not inherit real estate, the heir
would be accorded "a term of not less than three years to sell" the
property.43 5 The Senate struck that clause, replacing it with "such
term as the laws of the State or Canton will permit."4 36 Only in 1854,
after these substantial amendments were in place, did the Senate ratify the treaty.43 7 Indeed, in a total of seven instances between 1830
and 1860, the Senate rejected or amended treaties regulating real
property rights of aliens. 4 38 In each of these examples, the political
branches voluntarily refrained from intruding on state sovereignty,
even where licensed to do so by the Supreme Court.
This pattern continued in the twentieth century. Only one year
before it argued Holland, the United States negotiated the first "federal-state" treaty clause to be included in the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. That clause provides that a federal state
is not obligated to comply with the treaty where compliance would
conflict with its federal structure. 4 3 The government's insistence on
this point reflects its judgment that, although the killing of migratory
birds falls within the proper scope of the treaty power, the same may
not be true of other subjects traditionally regulated by the states.
Since then, the political branches' efforts to accommodate federalism concerns have grown increasingly prominent. 44 0 Duncan Hollis
Hayden, supra note 64, at 572.
See id. at 574-75.
434
Id. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted).
435
Id. at 576.
436
Id. at 577 (internal quotation marks omitted).
437 See id.
438 See id. at 584.
439 See Hollis, supra note 295, at 1368-69.
440 See id. at 1363 ("[Ejxecutive self-restraint on federalism grounds has become an
increasingly visible feature of U.S. treaty-making. In recent years, the executive-not the
Court-has limited treaties from expanding federal law-making beyond Congress's legislative powers or interfering with activities traditionally regulated by the states.").
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divides the forms of voluntary federalism accommodation into five
types. First, the political branches have rejected treaties that would
unduly impinge on state prerogatives. For example, the United States
has resisted ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, arguing that its provisions were, "in view of the
nature of the United States federal system [,] . . . not acceptable."441
The United States has not joined the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child because it focuses on areas "of almost exclusive state-level
authority." 442
Second, the government has sought to modify treaties to accommodate federalism concerns. In some cases, the political branches
have negotiated federal-state clauses similar to the one found in the
International Labor Organization Charter. For example, the 1967
Protocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
provides:
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State ... with respect to
those articles of the Convention . .. that come within the legislative

jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are
not, under the constitutional system of the federation, bound to
take legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the appropriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest
possible moment.4 43
The Secretary of State's Report (July 25, 1968) that accompanied the
President's transmittal of the Protocol to the Senate noted that "[b]y
virtue of Article VI of the Protocol[,] . . . [s]tate laws would not be
superseded by any provision of the Convention."4 44
In other cases, the government has sought to renegotiate the underlying treaty provisions to avoid implicating state law. For example,
in negotiations over the Tobacco Convention, the United States insisted that the Convention only impose obligations on signatories "in
areas of existing national jurisdiction as determined by national
law. "'46
441
Id. at 1372-73 (quoting Letter of Submittal from Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State, to the President (Dec. 17, 1977).
442
Spiro, supra note 283, at 575 (footnote omitted).
443
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 6(b), opened for signatureJan. 31,

1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S 267.
444
Advisory Comm. on Int'l Law, U.S. Dep't of State, Memorandum Summarizing U.S.
Views and Practice in Addressing Federalism Issues in Treaties (Nov. 8, 2002), available at
http://state.gov/s//38637.htm [hereinafter State Dep't Memo].
445
Hollis, supra note 295, at 1377 (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL art. 8 (May 21, 2003), availableat http://
On the other hand, the
www.who.int/tobacco/framework/download/en/index.html).
United States has sometimes declined to utilize federal-state clauses placed in treaties by
other countries-for example, Article 40 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
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Third, the political branches have modified U.S. consent to treaties through RUDs. 44 6 As discussed earlier, a RUD is an interpretative
statement designed to clarify or elaborate the consenting party's understanding of a treaty. 4 4 7 Many RUDs specifically reference federalism as a limitation on U.S. consent. 44 8 For instance, the United States
has attached RUDs to three prominent international human rights
treaties: the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Covenant to
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 4 49
The U.S. ratification of the 1984 CAT included the following prototypical understanding:
That the United States understands that this Convention shall be
implemented by the United States Government to the extent that it
exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered by the Convention and otherwise by the state and local
govermncnts [sic]. Accordingly, in implementing articles 10-14 and
16, the United States Government shall take measures appropriate
to the Federal system to the end that the competent authorities of
the constituent units of the United States of America may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Convention.4 50
This language, limiting the Convention to the "legislative and judicial jurisdiction" of the federal government,4 5' is precisely designed
to disallow provisions in a treaty that exceed the scope of Congress's
Article I powers. Almost identical language is present in Senate reservations to the CERD 452 and the ICCPR.453 Moreover, the U.S. ratificational Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89., which was
included at the request of Canada.
446
See supra notes 411-14 and accompanying text.
447 See Hollis, supra note 295, at 1378-79; supra Part I.C.2 (describing RUDs).
448
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(l)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, 681 (defining "reservation" as "purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State").
449
See State Dep't Memo, supra note 444.
450
Id.
451
Id.
452
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, S. TREAny Doc. 95-18 (June 24, 1994), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
ntquery/z?trtys:095TD00018:%20 ("That the United States understands that this Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local
governments. To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over
such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures to
ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.").
453 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. TREATY Doc. 95-20,
2
(Apr. 2, 1992), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ntquery/z?trtys:095TD000 0:%
20 ("That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over
the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local governments; to the ex-
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tion of the ICCPR was subject to reservations that more specifically
implicated federalism concerns 4 5 4-for example, a reservation concerning the right to impose capital punishment on juvenile offenders,
a decision that falls within the traditional purview of the states. 455
Overall, these RUDs signal the political branches' unwillingness to accept treaty obligations that require them to modify state laws.
Scholars have interpreted this practice as, alternatively, a way to
facilitate U.S. membership in the core human rights treaties without
sacrificing federalism values4 5 6 or the federal government's abdication
of its responsibility for human rights. 4 5 7 In either case, the fact remains that the established practice of adding federalism RUDs represents an effort to avoid constitutional confrontation between the states
and federal treaty power.
Fourth, the political branches sometimes leave states responsible
for implementation of those treaty obligations that fall beyond Congress's enumerated powers.4 5 8 For example, the United States has ratified two optional protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child as well as the Terrorist Bombings Convention, both of which
impose obligations in traditional areas of state regulation. In each
case, the executive explained that the United States was already in
compliance with those obligations through existing state criminal
law. 45 9
Finally, the political branches have limited U.S. implementation
and enforcement of treaties by declining to compel state agencies to
carry out treaty obligations. 46 0 In Sanitary District of Chicago v. United
States, the Supreme Court found that the executive has standing to sue
a state agency "to carry out treaty obligations to a foreign power."4 6 1
In practice, however, the government generally declines to do so. For
example, in Breard v. Greene,4 62 the Solicitor General argued that the
government lacked the power to enforce the VCCR against the states
because "our federal system imposes limits on the federal governtent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the
competent authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures for
the fulfillment of the Covenant.").
454 See Brad R. Roth, Understandingthe "Understanding":FederalismConstraintson Human
Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REv. 891, 891-92, 894 (2001).
455
See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 342 (1995).
456
See Hollis, supra note 295, at 1378, 1381.
457
See Spiro, supra note 283, at 567.
458
See Hollis, supra note 295, at 1382-83.
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ment's ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the
States." 4 63
Granted, the political branches' accommodation of federalism
has not been wholly consistent. The United States has joined treaties
that impose obligations regarding traditional areas of state power. For
example, the United States has ratified the Road Traffic Convention,
providing for recognition of foreign drivers' licenses, the Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, which preempts
state commercial law, and the U.N. Headquarters Agreement, which
imposes obligations on state and local officials.4 64 Nonetheless, the
political branches have shown themselves highly attuned to federalism
concerns. Even where courts have declined to impose obligatory limits, the political branches have themselves restrained the reach and
scope of treaties in deference to federalism principles.
2.

Bottom-Up Federalism

In addition to these forms of top-down federalism accommodation, the states have engaged in bottom-up federalism accommodation by playing a direct role in shaping U.S. compliance with
international law. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the federal government bears the sole responsibility for implementing its
treaty obligations, the states are increasingly asserting their independent voice in areas such as private international law, consular relations, and even human rights. This state-level implementation often
takes place in areas where the federal government has intentionally
abstained from enforcing international obligations against the states,
as described above. In some instances, however, states have taken the
initiative to implement treaties to which the United States is not a
party. These forms of state action in treaty implementation are often
overlooked, yet constitute an integral part of the flexible system of
federalism accommodation that we describe.
State-level implementation of treaty obligations generally follows
one of three models. First, states may implement treaties to which the
United States is a party but has not enforced against the states. This
model is particularly prevalent in private international law. 46 5 For example, the Convention on the Form of an International Will (Washington Convention) was designed to hannonize systems for executing
and recognizing wills-a subject that falls squarely within the areas of
463
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 51, Breard
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-1390) (quoted in Hollis, supra note 295, at 1385).
464 See Hollis, supra note 295, at 1371-72.
465 SeeJulian G. Ku, The CrucialRote of the States and PrivateInternationalLaw Treaties: A
Model for Accommodating Globalization,73 Mo. L. Rav. 1063, 1067 (2008).
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traditional state regulation.46 6 The treaty's proponents recognized
that the Convention would implicate federalism concerns. 46 7 As initially envisioned, therefore, both the federal government and the
states were to pass separate implementing legislation. The federal legislation would provide for the execution of international wills abroad
and for the recognition of international wills in the United States,
while each state would be free to decide whether to adopt the Uniform International Wills Act, which provided for testators to execute
international wills within its territory.4 68 The Senate gave its advice
and consent in 1992, but Congress never passed federal implementing
legislation, and the President has withheld ratification until it does
so. 4 6 9 Nonetheless, as of 2008, twenty states had implemented it by
independently enacting the Uniform International Wills Act. 4 70
This model has also appeared in the area of consular relations.
Numerous early treaties allowed a foreign consul to administer the
estates of a national who died intestate in the receiving state, while
others required consular notification whenever a citizen of one party
died without heirs in the territory of another.4 7 ' Although it had
taken on these treaty obligations, the federal government took no
steps to implement them. Rather, foreign consular officials addressed
requests for notification directly to the state governments, and at least
seven states adopted legislation requiring consular notification.4 72
A similar situation has emerged with respect to the VCCR. Article
36 of the VCCR requires that a foreign national placed under arrest
be notified of the right to request that the foreign national's consular
officials be notified at that time. 4 73 While the federal government has
promulgated regulations making the VCCR binding on federal officials and the State Department has published detailed guidelines on
its implementation at the federal, state, and local levels, 47 4 the United
States has not enforced the VCCR's requirements against the states.4 7 5
Instead, it relies on the states' voluntary compliance with the Conven466
SeeJulian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with
InternationalLaw, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457, 501-04 (2004).
467
See Letter from George P. Shultz, Sec'y of State, to President Ronald Reagan (June
4, 1986), available at http://www.cabinetchone.com/website/will/message.html.
468
See id.
469 See Ku, supra note 465, at 1067.
470
See id.
471
See Willard L. Boyd, Constitutional,Treaty, and Statutory Requirements of ProbateNotification to Consuls and Aliens, 47 IowA L. REv. 29, 30-32 (1961).
472
See Ku, supra note 465, at 482-83 & n.133.
473 See VCCR, supra note 185, at art. 36.1(b).
474 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1) (1967). See generally U.S. DEP'r OF STATE, CONSULAR NoTIFICATION AND ACCESS (3d ed. 2010), availableat www.travel.state.gov/consularnotification.
475
See William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations: A Study of Rights,
Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J, TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 260 (1998); Johanna Kalb, Dynamic
Federalismin Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 84 TUL. L. REv. 1025, 1039 (2010). The
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tion's requirements. This strategy has at times resulted in noncompliance, for example in the highly publicized Avena decision in which
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found the United States in
violation of the Convention because of Texas's failure to provide consular notification in a series of capital cases.4 7 6 However, some states
and localities have passed their own implementing legislation even in
the absence of federal compulsion.4 7 7 And despite Texas's failure to
implement its obligations following the Avena case,47 8 the lesserknown case of Osbaldo Torres offers a salient counterexample.
Torres had been sentenced to death in Oklahoma and was one of the
Mexican nationals whose case was considered in Avena. Following the
ICJ judgment, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals stayed his execution
and ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he had
been prejudiced by the VCCR violation.4 7 9 On the same day, the
Oklahoma governor commuted Torres's sentence to life without
parole. 48 0
Second, states may implement treaties through concurrent legislation that works in tandem with federal implementing legislation or a
self-executing treaty. For example, as Julian Ku has described, Congress passed the International Civil Abduction Remedies Act to implement U.S. obligations under the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction. Nonetheless, a number of
states have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Enforcement Act,
which allows them to implement the Hague Convention at the state
level. 481 Similarly, most states have passed laws to implement the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents even though that Convention is likely self-executing. 48 2
In each of these cases, the state legislation applies concurrently with
federal or treaty law. This practice allows states to protect their institutional prerogatives while still maintaining U.S. compliance with its international obligations.
Finally, states implement obligations created by treaties to which
the United States is not a party. In the private international law arena,
reason for this may be, in part, the anticommandeering concerns discussed above. See
supra Part II.A.3.
476
See Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Avena), 2004
115-23 (Mar. 31).
I.C.J. 128,
477
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §834c (1999); FiA. STATE. ANN. §§ 901.26(3),
288.816(2)(f) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642 (2005).
478
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
479 See Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary Hearing, Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *1 (Olda. Crim. App. May 13,
2004).
480
See Kalb, supra note 475, at 1047.
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the states have played an active role in adopting provisions of Conventions promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private International
Law that have yet to be ratified by the United States. For example,
forty-six states have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act, which implements a provision of the Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures of the Protection of Children.483 Similarly, eighteen states have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code, which contains provisions "in harmony with"
the Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the Form
of Testamentary Dispositions.484 Nineteen states have adopted the
Uniform Trust Code, which provides choice of law rules "consistent
with" the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on
their Recognition.4 85
In the human rights arena, subnational governments have begun
to assert a role where the federal government has failed to act. For
example, although the United States has not ratified the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Los Angeles and San Francisco have made portions of it
binding law.48 6 By 2004 "forty-four U.S. cities, eighteen counties, and
sixteen states had passed or considered legislation relating to CEDAW,
with yet others contemplating action.""8 7 A number of cities, including Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Santa Cruz, have called on state officials to enact a moratorium on the death penalty in order to bring the
United States into compliance with the Second Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR, which the United States has not ratified.4 8 Ten cities and
five states, including New York, have passed resolutions in support of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) .489 Numerous cities
have put in place human rights commissions designed to aid in the
implementation and adoption of human rights treaties. 490 And the
United States Conference of Mayors agreed to the Mayors Climate
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Protection Agreement, which commits their cities to meeting Kyoto
targets. 49 ' Currently, 1,054 cities, with a combined population of almost ninety-million people,4 9 2 have signed onto this agreement. Similarly, in 2006, California signed into law the Global Warming
Solutions Act, which effectively commits the state to their targets
under Kyoto.4 9 3 These trends signal a newfound assertiveness on the
part of state and local governments in foreign affairs.
These forms of federalism accommodation-both top-down and
bottom-up-demonstrate that the relationship between the federal
government and the states in foreign affairs is complex and dynamic.
This system has arisen largely withoutjudicial intervention. The structural, political, and diplomatic checks described above have generated
mechanisms for addressing federalism concerns through the political
branches' own actions, without need for judicial intervention.
CONCLUSION

The United States v. Bond case with which this Article began has
brought a long-simmering debate over the proper scope of the Treaty
Clause back to the courts. Once again, the courts are asked to step in
to decide the scope of the federal government's power to make treaties-and whether the federal government has the power to enact laws
that fall outside the scope of the enumerated powers granted to it in
Article I.
The federal government is a government of limited powers. The
Tenth Amendment specifically provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."4 9 4
Hence, some perceive any increase in the power of the federal government as a deprivation of power from the states. Specifically, if the
Treaty Clause gives the federal government power above and beyond
that specifically provided for in Article I, it allows the federal government to infringe on those areas otherwise within the sole control of
the states. That, in turn, it is feared, could open the door to abuse of
this power-with the federal government circumventing constraints
on its powers by enacting treaties and then legislating pursuant to
them, at the expense of the states.
Resnik, supra note 487, at 1122.
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Yet this cacophony of fears gives little credit to those who designed the Constitution. The Framers placed the treaty power outside
of Article I precisely because the limits that applied to those enumerated powers were not meant to apply to the treaty power. In doing so,
they were not turning a blind eye to the dangers of power run amok.
Indeed, they were deeply suspicious of any unchecked power and
sought to jealously guard the power of the states to act independent of
the federal government. It was precisely these concerns that led them
to design the Treaty Clause they did-one that vested the power to
make treaties in the President, but only with the consent of two-thirds
of the Senate. This supermajority bar is among the highest in the
Constitution, exceeded only by the requirement that three-quarters of
the states agree before the Constitution itself could be amended. This
provision-one inherent in the design of the Treaty Clause itself-was
designed precisely to gives states the very voice and control over the
treaty-making process that critics fear the Treaty Clause threatens to
deny them. This structural protection is reinforced, moreover, by political checks-the necessity that those with a role in making treaties
must win reelection and thus be able to justify any decisions to the
voters. It is also backed up by diplomatic checks-a treaty is not a
treaty unless another sovereign state consents to it, and other states
are unlikely to wish to wade into internal political struggles by entering a treaty understood to violate the fundamental constitutional allocation of power.
The Treaty Clause has served its purpose-perhaps too well.4 9 5 It
has prevented the passage of all but a handful of Article II treaties
each year since the Founding. The political, structural, and diplomatic checks that the Framers put in place have served to create a
system of federal accommodation that does not require intervention
by the courts. Top-down federalism accommodates federalism concerns through self-restraint by the federal government institutions.
The President and the Senate actively work to accommodate federalism concerns by rejecting treaties that would impinge on state prerogatives, modifying treaties to address federalism concerns, providing
for state implementation of treaties, and by declining to compel state
agencies to carry out treaty obligations. This operates alongside bottom-up federalism-accommodation of federalism concerns by states
that play a direct and active role in shaping the international lawmaking process. In a variety of areas, states have been on the front lines of
implementing treaties and thus played an active role in their interpretation and in determining when and how the treaty will affect the
states.
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It is highly unlikely that a treaty that survives this process will fail
any of the tests to which the courts might reasonably put it. The affirmative limits on the federal government's power protect against
treaties that violate constitutional rights and structure, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and anticommandeering. Yet, it is hard to imagine that any treaty that fails these tests would survive the rough-andtumble political process put in place by Article II. The same is true of
the legal limits on implementing legislation-which must be necessary
and proper to carrying out the treaty obligations. And any treaty that
would fail the pretext test-even the more fully specified version outlined in this Article-would be unlikely to win the support of the President and Senate. In sum, the chance that a treaty will slip through
the treaty-making process that violates these court-enforced limits remains small.
For those concerned about federalism, the conclusion that there
is little role for the courts in the debate should be a cause not for
despair but for celebration. The flexible system of accommodation
that has grown up around the treaty power has proven extraordinarily
effective at protecting against abuse of the federal treaty power. The
treaty power binds itself more effectively than the courts ever could.

